Description

Use after free in Windows Bind Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:15.470Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:15.470Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in the Windows Bind Filter Driver due to a use-after-free memory management flaw. The weakness allows an authorized local attacker to achieve code execution or compromise system integrity at an elevated privilege level.\nThe affected product is the Windows operating system specifically within the Windows Bind Filter Driver component. The risk implications are severe, as successful exploitation enables a local adversary to bypass security boundaries, potentially leading to complete system compromise.\nAttacker capabilities require local access to the target host and prior authentication to execute code. Exploitation prerequisites mandate that the attacker possesses sufficient local execution privileges to interact with the vulnerable driver interface and trigger the underlying memory corruption condition. No remote network exposure is associated with this local vulnerability vector.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is a classic use-after-free (UAF) condition residing within the Windows Bind Filter Driver component. The root cause stems from improper lifetime management of heap-allocated objects during specific input/output control (IOCTL) or driver callback operations. When the driver releases an object reference prematurely while maintaining dangling pointers elsewhere in memory, subsequent read or write operations to the freed memory location introduce memory corruption.\nExploitation of this use-after-free vulnerability requires the attacker to execute malicious code locally on the target system. The attack flow begins with the adversary interacting with the vulnerable driver via device input/output operations, typically through standard Win32 API calls such as DeviceIoControl. By carefully orchestrating memory allocation and deallocation patterns, the attacker induces a race condition or precise execution sequence that forces the driver to reference the dangling pointer.\nOnce the dangling pointer is dereferenced, the attacker can hijack the control flow or manipulate kernel-mode data structures. This manipulation is achieved through heap feng-shui techniques, where the freed memory chunk is reclaimed by controlled attacker data prior to the driver accessing the stale pointer. The payload behavior involves overwriting function pointers or critical object metadata, redirecting execution to malicious shellcode running in ring 0.\nThe authentication requirements mandate that the attacker must already be authenticated on the local system with standard user privileges. The privilege requirements necessitate that the process interacting with the driver is executing locally, though low-privileged users may be able to trigger the flaw depending on the specific device object discretionary access control lists (DACLs). The vulnerability lacks network exposure, restricting the attack surface exclusively to local execution vectors. Post-exploitation impact results in local elevation of privileges, allowing the adversary to execute arbitrary code within the Windows kernel, disable security controls, and attain complete administrative control over the operating system."
}