Description

Out-of-bounds read in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:13.960Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:13.960Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An out-of-bound read vulnerability exists within the Remote Desktop Client, posing significant security risks to affected systems and network architectures.\nThe vulnerability allows an unauthorized remote attacker to trigger memory disclosure over a network, potentially exposing sensitive data stored within process memory spaces.\nThe flaw affects the Remote Desktop Client product line, impacting confidentiality by enabling unauthorized information disclosure without requiring authentication.\nAttackers can leverage network exposure to interact with vulnerable client implementations, exploiting improper bounds checking during packet processing or state handling.\nSuccessful exploitation requires the targeted client to process malicious responses or streams provided by an attacker-controlled endpoint or compromised remote desktop server.\nThe risk implications include the potential leakage of cryptographic keys, session tokens, or other sensitive runtime data, which could facilitate subsequent compromise vectors.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from insufficient bounds checking within the Remote Desktop Client codebase when parsing incoming data structures or network packets.\nSpecifically, the vulnerable component fails to properly validate input length parameters against the allocated buffer size prior to performing read operations.\nThis improper validation leads to an out-of-bounds read condition, allowing memory offsets to be accessed beyond the intended boundaries of the allocated buffer.\nThe vulnerability is exposed over a network vector, requiring the Remote Desktop Client to establish a connection with a malicious or compromised remote entity.\nThe attack flow begins when an unauthorized attacker induces the client to process a maliciously crafted network stream or response sequence.\nDuring processing, the client reads memory contents adjacent to the intended data buffers due to the lack of strict input sanitization and boundary verification.\nThe payload behavior involves capturing the leaked memory contents, which are subsequently returned or exposed through protocol response mechanisms back to the attacker.\nPrivilege requirements are minimal, as the attack can be executed by an unauthorized remote entity capable of interacting with the client over the network protocol.\nNo elevated privileges on the target system are required by the attacker to trigger the out-of-bounds read condition.\nThe post-exploitation impact centers on information disclosure, where the leaked memory contents may contain sensitive application state data, internal memory addresses, or user credentials that can be leveraged for further attacks."
}