Description

In handle_app_val_response of btif_rc.cc, there is a possible way to achieve code execution due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-05T19:17:25.377Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-05T19:17:25.377Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical race condition vulnerability exists within the handle_app_val_response function of the btif_rc.cc component, which handles Bluetooth remote control operations.\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the target system.\nThe flaw facilitates local escalation of privilege, granting an attacker higher-level access than their existing permissions allow.\nThe vulnerability does not require user interaction, making it particularly dangerous as it can be triggered silently.\nExploitation requires no additional execution privileges, meaning an attacker with minimal system access can potentially gain elevated control.\nThis represents a significant security risk to the Bluetooth subsystem, potentially exposing the entire device to compromise by leveraging standard local attack vectors.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the handle_app_val_response function located in the btif_rc.cc source file. The root cause is a race condition occurring during the asynchronous handling of application validation responses within the Bluetooth stack.\nIn multithreaded environments, such as the Bluetooth Remote Control (RC) interface, state management is critical. The handle_app_val_response function fails to maintain proper atomicity or synchronization when processing response packets from the Bluetooth application layer.\nAn attacker can exploit this by timing the delivery of specifically crafted Bluetooth packets to coincide with the asynchronous processing cycle of handle_app_val_response. By inducing a race between the verification state check and the actual memory operation, an attacker can trigger a Use-After-Free (UAF) or a similar memory corruption state.\nStep-by-step exploitation involves the following: First, the attacker initiates a Bluetooth RC transaction that forces the system into the vulnerable handle_app_val_response code path. Second, the attacker sends concurrent, specially crafted packets designed to trigger a re-entrant call or a race condition within the state machine that governs the response validation process. Third, because the function does not properly lock the affected data structures, the system enters an inconsistent state where a memory pointer is accessed after it has been freed or while it is being reallocated.\nThis memory corruption allows the attacker to hijack the control flow of the execution process. By carefully grooming the heap, the attacker can replace the corrupted memory object with malicious data, redirecting function pointers or overwriting return addresses to redirect the execution flow to a payload provided by the attacker.\nBecause the Bluetooth service often runs with system or elevated privileges, the successful exploitation of this flaw leads directly to local escalation of privilege. The lack of requirement for user interaction implies that the attack can be executed entirely through the Bluetooth radio stack, provided the attacker is within range to communicate with the Bluetooth controller interface. Post-exploitation, the attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Bluetooth process, which typically possesses significant system-level access, allowing for complete system compromise, data exfiltration, or further persistence installation."
}