Description

Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T17:17:26.080Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T17:17:26.080Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves a Cross-Repo Information Disclosure flaw manifesting via Organization-Level Actions Run and Job APIs. The security defect allows unauthorized cross-repository access to sensitive execution data, workflow artifacts, logs, and environment variables across repositories within the same affected organization structure. The primary impact includes the unauthorized exposure of proprietary source code, secrets, credentials, and internal infrastructure details to potentially malicious actors with access to peer repositories. Risk implications are severe, as compromised secrets can facilitate lateral movement, privilege escalation, and full infrastructure compromise. Attacker capabilities encompass reading workflow run data and job logs from repositories they should not normally have access to within the organizational boundary. Exploitation requirements generally depend on abusing organizational-level API permissions, misconfigured access controls, or insecure direct object reference behaviors within the Actions Run and Job API endpoints. Organizations utilizing centralized workflow orchestration and broad organization-level tokens are at elevated risk of unauthorized data exposure and subsequent supply chain compromise.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in insufficient authorization checks and access control enforcement within the organization-level Actions Run and Job APIs. When processing API requests to retrieve workflow execution details, run history, or job logs at the organization scope, the vulnerable component fails to properly validate whether the requesting entity or context possesses legitimate, scoped authorization to access resources belonging to a specific target repository within the organization. This allows an actor with access to one repository or a broad organization-level token to query and extract execution data belonging to completely separate, isolated repositories. The exploitation method relies on interacting directly with the affected API endpoints by manipulating repository identifiers, run IDs, or job IDs. The attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies or obtains a valid authentication token or session with organization-level visibility or broad API access. Second, the attacker formulates targeted API requests directed at the organization-level Actions Run or Job endpoints. Third, by systematically iterating through or directly specifying target repository parameters and run identifiers, the attacker bypasses repository isolation boundaries. Fourth, the vulnerable API endpoints process the request without verifying cross-repository boundaries, returning the requested execution data, environment configurations, and job logs in the HTTP response. The vulnerable components are the backend API handlers responsible for servicing organization-level GitHub Actions run and job telemetry data. Authentication requirements depend on the API access level, but often require low-privilege organization membership or compromised integration tokens. Privilege requirements are minimal beyond standard read access to organization-level APIs. Network exposure is tied to the platform's external API gateway, exposing the endpoints over HTTPS. The payload behavior involves standard REST API GET requests constructed to query unauthorized resource identifiers. The post-exploitation impact includes the extraction of hardcoded secrets, API keys, deployment credentials, and proprietary source code exposed in workflow logs, enabling further internal network penetration, unauthorized modifications, and complete confidentiality breaches across distinct software development projects within the organization."
}