Description

Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override (CWE-295)

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T17:17:24.377Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T17:17:24.377Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The identified security defect involves an internal API HTTP client that hardcodes the InsecureSkipVerify configuration parameter to true without providing any operational configuration override mechanism.\nThis vulnerability maps to CWE-295, which denotes improper certificate validation, severely undermining the cryptographic integrity of Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections initiated by the internal system.\nThe primary impact of this flaw is the complete degradation of trust validation during the TLS handshake phase, exposing internal communications to catastrophic interception and manipulation.\nAffected systems encompass internal API HTTP clients relying on the insecure codebase where TLS certificate validation is systematically bypassed.\nThe risk implications are critical, as the lack of certificate verification completely invalidates the authenticity guarantees provided by X.509 certificates.\nAn attacker possessing network positioning capabilities to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks can exploit this vulnerability without requiring prior authentication, specialized privileges, or complex bypass techniques.\nThe exploitation requirement is strictly dependent on the attacker's ability to intercept network traffic between the internal API HTTP client and its intended remote endpoints, allowing seamless impersonation and data exfiltration.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the explicit programmatic assignment of the InsecureSkipVerify boolean flag to true within the TLS configuration struct of the internal API HTTP client.\nBy hardcoding this parameter and omitting any conditional environment variable or configuration file override, the underlying HTTP transport layer disables server certificate verification entirely for all outgoing requests.\nThe vulnerable component is the TLS configuration module utilized by the internal API HTTP client.\nNetwork exposure affects internal network segments where outgoing API requests traverse untrusted or monitored network boundaries, as well as scenarios where compromised internal routing enables traffic redirection.\nAuthentication and privilege requirements to exploit this vulnerability are negligible from an application security perspective, as the flaw resides entirely in client-side trust logic rather than authorization controls.\nThe exploitation method relies on a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack vector.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker intercepts the TCP connection established by the internal API HTTP client destined for a remote server or internal service endpoint. Second, when the TLS handshake is initiated, the attacker presents an arbitrary, self-signed, or fraudulently obtained X.509 certificate instead of the legitimate server certificate. Third, because the internal API HTTP client has InsecureSkipVerify set to true, the client crypto stack bypasses all verification checks regarding certificate chain of trust, expiration, and hostname matching. Fourth, the TLS handshake completes successfully, establishing an encrypted session between the client and the attacker's proxy rather than the intended destination. Fifth, the attacker decrypts the traffic, inspects or modifies sensitive payloads such as authentication tokens, personal identifiable information, or internal command data, and optionally re-encrypts and forwards the traffic to the actual server to maintain operational transparency.\nThe payload behavior during post-exploitation includes passive data harvesting of confidential parameters, active manipulation of API requests and responses, and potential lateral movement facilitation if authentication credentials are intercepted in transit."
}