Description

The root password hash of the device can be obtained through unencrypted information in the firmware.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "2.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-07T05:17:02.083Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-07T05:17:02.083Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves the exposure of the root password hash through unencrypted information stored within device firmware images. The flaw permits unauthorized actors to extract cryptographic password hashes corresponding to the root user account directly from static firmware binaries or filesystem artifacts. The primary business and operational impact centers on complete administrative compromise of affected devices, as attackers possessing the extracted hash can initiate offline brute-force cracking attempts or leverage pass-the-hash methodologies to gain unauthorized administrative access. Affected systems include devices that inadequately protect sensitive credential material within their update packages or deployment binaries. The risk implications are severe, effectively undermining the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the underlying operating system and any services hosted thereon. Attacker capabilities require static analysis or extraction tools to parse the unencrypted firmware payload, but typically do not necessitate prior authentication or privileged access to the target device itself. Exploitation requirements are minimal, relying entirely on the availability of the firmware image and the presence of plaintext or weakly obfuscated cryptographic artifacts containing the root credential data.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the insecure handling and storage of sensitive authentication material within device firmware binaries. Specifically, the root account password hash is embedded directly into the filesystem or configuration files without sufficient encryption, obfuscation, or cryptographic protection. During the compilation or packaging phase of the firmware release cycle, build processes incorrectly bundle sensitive credential artifacts into publicly accessible or unencrypted partitions, squashfs images, or configuration archives.\nThe root cause is a failure of secure credential management and cryptographic design within the firmware generation pipeline. Rather than utilizing externalized key stores, dynamic user provisioning, or secure boot-based credential binding, the device relies on static shadow files or configuration tables that contain the hardcoded or pre-hashed root password.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker obtains the target device firmware image, either by downloading it from the vendor public support portal, intercepting an over-the-air update mechanism, or dumping it directly via physical flash memory interfaces. Second, the attacker utilizes automated extraction utilities or manual file carving techniques—such as binwalk, unsquashfs, or standard archive extraction tools—to decompress and mount the firmware filesystem. Third, the attacker navigates the extracted directory structure to locate the authentication configuration files, typically targeting the /etc/shadow or equivalent credential storage paths. Fourth, the attacker parses the file to extract the specific root password hash string.\nFollowing successful extraction, the post-exploitation phase begins. Armed with the cryptographic hash, the attacker can execute offline dictionary or brute-force attacks utilizing specialized hardware or software suites such as Hashcat or John the Ripper. Because the hash is processed offline, the attacker faces no account lockout mechanisms or network rate-limiting defenses typically enforced by live authentication daemons. Once the plaintext password is recovered, the attacker can leverage network protocols such as SSH, Telnet, or serial consoles to authenticate as the root user, achieving unrestricted administrative control over the target operating system."
}