Description

OpenTelemetry, also known as OTel, is a vendor-neutral open source Observability framework for instrumenting, generating, collecting, and exporting telemetry data such as traces, metrics, and logs. Prior to 0.154.0, the Sentry exporter reads the remote OTLP sender-controlled service.name resource attribute in exporter/sentryexporter/sentry_exporter.go through extractProjectSlug and getOrCreateProjectEndpoint, passes the raw project slug to GetOTLPEndpoints and GetProjectKeys in exporter/sentryexporter/sentry_client.go, and interpolates it into a Sentry API URL without applying projectSlugRegexp through validateRoutingConfig at runtime in exporter/sentryexporter/config.go. Special characters can turn the expected path suffix into query data in all deployments or introduce slash and dot segments that traverse paths when the Sentry deployment normalizes them, while the Collector attaches its operator-configured bearer token to the request. A successful request can reach token-authorized administrative, organization, member, or key endpoints within the configured Sentry organization, and an attacker-controlled project slug can redirect subsequently exported telemetry. Sentry token middleware prevents cross-organization access. This issue is fixed in version 0.154.0.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T18:17:48.250Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T18:17:48.250Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A path traversal and arbitrary API routing vulnerability exists in the OpenTelemetry Sentry exporter prior to version 0.154.0. The vulnerability originates from the insecure handling of the OTLP service.name resource attribute, which is used to construct Sentry API URLs without proper validation or sanitization.\nBy injecting specially crafted characters into the project slug, an unauthenticated attacker capable of influencing telemetry data can manipulate the OTLP sender to direct requests to unauthorized Sentry API endpoints. This allows the attacker to interact with administrative, organization, member, or key-specific endpoints within the pre-configured Sentry organization using the Collector’s authenticated bearer token.\nWhile Sentry token middleware restricts requests to the configured organization, the vulnerability enables unauthorized actions, including the potential redirection of telemetry streams. This represents a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of observability data, as well as unauthorized manipulation of Sentry project configurations. Exploitation requires the ability to influence OTLP resource attributes sent to the OpenTelemetry Collector.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the interaction between exporter/sentryexporter/sentry_exporter.go and exporter/sentryexporter/config.go. The Sentry exporter extracts the service.name resource attribute from incoming OTLP telemetry data using extractProjectSlug and getOrCreateProjectEndpoint. This raw, untrusted string is subsequently passed into GetOTLPEndpoints and GetProjectKeys within exporter/sentryexporter/sentry_client.go.\nThe root cause is the failure to enforce the projectSlugRegexp validation defined in validateRoutingConfig when the service.name attribute is interpolated into the Sentry API URL at runtime. Because the input is not sanitized, an attacker can supply a payload containing path traversal sequences (dot-dot-slash) or special characters that cause the Sentry API to interpret the input as query parameters or additional path segments.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1. An attacker influences a service to transmit telemetry data containing a malicious OTLP service.name attribute. 2. The OpenTelemetry Collector receives this data and passes the malicious string into the Sentry exporter. 3. The exporter fails to validate the string against the required project slug format, allowing the injection of directory traversal sequences or query delimiters. 4. The underlying HTTP client constructs a request to the Sentry API, where the injected payload alters the target path. 5. The Sentry exporter attaches the operator-configured, high-privilege bearer token to this malformed request.\nThe impact allows the attacker to reach administrative or restricted endpoints within the organization that the Collector is authorized to access. This can be leveraged to exfiltrate information, modify project configurations, or redirect the flow of telemetry data to arbitrary destinations controlled by the attacker. Since the request is performed with the Collector's bearer token, the Sentry API treats the request as authorized. While the Sentry token middleware prevents cross-organization access, the scope of exploitation remains confined to the authorized organization, posing a significant risk of internal resource manipulation and data exfiltration."
}