Description

Unauthenticated Sensitive Data Exposure in SafeSnap – Verified WordPress Backup &amp; Restore <= 2.1.2 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-06T09:17:53.583Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-06T09:17:53.583Z",
  "executiveSummary": "SafeSnap – Verified WordPress Backup & Restore versions 2.1.2 and below contain a critical vulnerability allowing unauthenticated sensitive data exposure.\nThe vulnerability resides in the plugin's failure to properly enforce access control mechanisms on backup-related endpoints, enabling unauthorized parties to access, download, or disclose sensitive database and configuration files.\nThis flaw represents an Information Disclosure vulnerability, which can be exploited by remote, unauthenticated attackers without requiring prior system interaction or elevated privileges.\nSuccessful exploitation poses a severe risk to the confidentiality and integrity of the entire WordPress installation. Attackers can leverage the exposed sensitive data to gain full control over the site by obtaining administrative credentials, secret keys, or database configurations.\nThe vulnerability is accessible over the network, and the simplicity of the exploitation path makes this a high-priority security concern for administrators managing affected versions.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability in SafeSnap <= 2.1.2 stems from improper authorization checks implemented in the plugin's backup management module. Specifically, the software fails to validate the session state or the authentication status of requests sent to the backup retrieval and management functions.\nRoot Cause Analysis: The plugin exposes public-facing endpoints designed for backup file interactions that do not verify if the requesting user possesses administrative privileges. By design, these functions are intended for legitimate backup restoration or management, yet the underlying code lacks a gatekeeper mechanism to verify the identity of the requester. Consequently, these endpoints remain reachable by any unauthenticated remote actor.\nExploitation Flow: An attacker can trigger the vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request directly to the vulnerable plugin endpoint. Since the input handling logic neglects the authentication requirement, the plugin processes the request as if it originated from a legitimate administrator. Upon processing, the plugin generates or retrieves requested backup artifacts—which may include full database dumps containing user tables, password hashes, and sensitive site settings—and returns them in the HTTP response body or exposes them via a direct download link.\nAttack Vector: This is a remote, unauthenticated attack vector. No user-specific tokens, cookies, or administrative sessions are required to manipulate the vulnerable component. The exploit can be automated, allowing an attacker to scrape and exfiltrate entire backup archives across multiple installations.\nPost-Exploitation Impact: The disclosure of full database backups grants the attacker a comprehensive view of the target environment. This includes, but is not limited to, hashing algorithms for user credentials (subjecting them to offline brute-force attacks), sensitive plugin configurations, API keys, and potential session management tokens. Once the database is obtained, the attacker can alter administrative account data, insert malicious payloads, or pivot further into the hosting environment, ultimately leading to a complete compromise of the affected WordPress instance."
}