Description

Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in GDPR Framework By Data443 <= 2.5.0 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-06T09:17:52.843Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-06T09:17:52.843Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The GDPR Framework By Data443 plugin, in versions 2.5.0 and below, contains a critical PHP Object Injection vulnerability.\nThis flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary serialized objects into the application, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE), arbitrary file deletion, or sensitive data access.\nThe vulnerability stems from the improper handling of user-supplied input that is passed directly to the PHP unserialize() function.\nThe risk is severe as it requires no prior authentication or administrative privileges to exploit.\nSuccessful exploitation allows an adversary to manipulate the application's object state, leveraging existing 'POP' (Property-Oriented Programming) chains present within the plugin or the wider WordPress environment.\nThe impact is significant, potentially granting an attacker full control over the compromised WordPress instance.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the insecure use of the unserialize() function on untrusted user-supplied data within the GDPR Framework By Data443 plugin.\nIn PHP, the unserialize() function can trigger magic methods such as __destruct(), __wakeup(), or __toString() when an object is instantiated from a serialized string.\nAn unauthenticated attacker can craft a malicious serialized payload and supply it via HTTP requests to specific endpoints handled by the plugin. If the input is not validated or sanitized before processing, the attacker gains the ability to instantiate arbitrary classes currently loaded in the application scope.\nExploitation involves identifying POP chains within the plugin's codebase or the core WordPress environment. A POP chain is a sequence of object properties and magic method calls that, when executed in a specific order, lead to unintended functionality such as file system manipulation, SQL injection, or code execution.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies a vulnerable entry point where user input is passed to unserialize(). Second, the attacker performs reconnaissance to map available classes and magic methods. Third, the attacker crafts a malicious serialized string containing the payload designed to trigger a specific POP chain. Fourth, the attacker sends the payload to the vulnerable endpoint. Fifth, the application deserializes the object, triggering the magic methods and executing the attacker-controlled logic.\nThis vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it bypasses conventional authentication mechanisms, allowing remote attackers to target the WordPress site directly over the network.\nThe post-exploitation impact is highly critical. Depending on the available POP chains, an attacker may achieve remote code execution, which can lead to complete site takeover, persistent backdoor installation, exfiltration of the site database, or lateral movement within the hosting environment.\nThe issue persists across all versions up to and including 2.5.0. Remediation is necessary to ensure the application no longer relies on insecure deserialization of untrusted input."
}