Description

DNG SDK versions 1.7.1 2502 and earlier are affected by an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that could lead to memory exposure. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information from memory. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-27T20:17:34.757Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-27T20:17:34.757Z",
  "executiveSummary": "DNG SDK versions 1.7.1 2502 and earlier are susceptible to an out-of-bounds (OOB) read vulnerability. This flaw allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive memory contents by inducing the application to process a specially crafted, malicious DNG file. The vulnerability exists within the file parsing logic of the SDK, where improper bounds validation leads to memory disclosure. The impact is significant, as it can result in the leakage of protected data residing in the process memory space. Successful exploitation requires user interaction, specifically the opening of a malicious file provided by the attacker. This vulnerability poses a risk to confidentiality, potentially exposing cryptographic keys, credentials, or other sensitive information held within the memory of the affected application.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the parsing engine of the DNG SDK, which fails to correctly validate input offsets or bounds when reading data from a DNG image file. An out-of-bounds read occurs when the software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. In this instance, a malicious DNG file can be engineered with metadata or image tags that define dimensions or offsets exceeding the allocated memory buffers.\nWhen the DNG SDK processes these malicious tags, it performs pointer arithmetic based on the attacker-supplied values rather than enforcing strict boundary checks against the actual allocated heap or stack buffer. Consequently, the SDK reads adjacent memory contents into the processing buffer. If these contents are subsequently processed or returned to an interface accessible by the user, the attacker can extract portions of the application's process memory.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker creates a malformed DNG file containing manipulated image headers or tag structures designed to trigger an out-of-bounds memory access. Second, the attacker induces a victim to open this file using an application integrated with the vulnerable DNG SDK. Third, the SDK's parsing routines attempt to read data from an invalid memory address derived from the file's malformed metadata. Fourth, the application, in its attempt to process the image, includes this out-of-bounds memory in the output, such as rendering the image, writing metadata to an exported file, or surfacing error messages that contain the leaked memory fragments.\nBecause the SDK operates within the security context of the user-facing application, there is no requirement for elevated privileges or specific authentication for the attacker, provided they can distribute the malicious file to the target. The impact is largely determined by the sensitivity of the data residing in the proximity of the SDK's internal buffers. In complex environments, this memory disclosure can serve as a primitive to defeat Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) or to facilitate more complex, multi-stage exploitation chains by revealing critical internal addresses or application secrets."
}