Description

A cross-site request forgery vulnerability was discovered in the login functionality (both standard and SAML) due to missing validation of the anti-CSRF token. An attacker with a valid account can trick a victim into unknowingly authenticating with the attacker's credentials. Any operation performed by the victim in this state is attributed to the attacker's account, compromising the integrity of the audit trail.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "3.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-08T14:17:22.687Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-08T14:17:22.687Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability exists within the application's login mechanism, affecting both standard and SAML-based authentication flows. The issue stems from a failure to validate anti-CSRF tokens during the authentication process, allowing an attacker to manipulate a victim's login session. By forcing a victim to authenticate using credentials provided by the attacker, the attacker can effectively 'link' their identity to the victim's browser session. This vulnerability poses a significant risk to the integrity of audit trails and session accountability. An authenticated attacker can exploit this condition by enticing a victim to visit a malicious, crafted webpage that triggers the login sequence with the attacker's account credentials. Once the victim is inadvertently logged into the attacker's account, subsequent actions taken by the victim are associated with the attacker's user profile, leading to potential identity confusion and audit log corruption. Successful exploitation requires the victim to have an active browser session and interact with the attacker-controlled content, effectively compromising the non-repudiation of the application's audit logging system.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the absence of mandatory anti-CSRF token validation within the application's login endpoints. CSRF protection typically relies on the inclusion of a cryptographically secure, unpredictable, and user-specific token within the request body or header. By omitting this validation step during the authentication phase, the application processes login requests blindly, provided the necessary parameters are present.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: An attacker with a valid account crafts a malicious web page containing an auto-submitting form or an AJAX request targeting the application's login endpoint. This request is pre-populated with the attacker's own credentials. When a victim, who may or may not be currently authenticated to the application, navigates to this malicious page, the browser automatically executes the login request. Because the server does not verify an anti-CSRF token, it accepts the attacker's credentials as legitimate and establishes a session for the victim using the attacker’s account context.\nThis vulnerability affects both standard password-based login forms and SAML assertion endpoints. In the case of SAML, the attacker may attempt to inject or redirect the SAML response processing to initiate a session under their identity. The primary impact is the manipulation of the application's audit trail. If the victim performs administrative or data-sensitive operations while logged in under the attacker's identity, those actions are cryptographically and logically attributed to the attacker, potentially masking the victim's true identity and activities.\nThis attack requires the victim to be tricked into visiting the attacker-controlled site. No special privileges are required for the attacker beyond having a standard, valid account on the target system. The vulnerability is exposed over the network, as any public-facing login endpoint is susceptible if it lacks proper state-changing request validation. Post-exploitation impact is limited to the integrity of session data and audit records; it does not typically grant the attacker direct access to the victim's personal account data, but rather forces the victim into the attacker's own session space. The application effectively loses the ability to distinguish between the intended user and the forced identity, creating a high-impact scenario for systems relying on strict user accountability and forensic logging."
}