Description

A flaw was found in wildfly-core. A remote user authenticated as an administrative user can inject a malformed payload into the Inet Address field through the Management Model. This injection causes the server to crash and become unrecoverable, as the payload is written into the standalone.xml configuration file. Manual intervention is required to restore server operation, leading to a denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T03:17:36.313Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T03:17:36.313Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A denial of service vulnerability exists within the wildfly-core product, specifically affecting the Management Model component. The flaw allows an authenticated remote user with administrative privileges to inject a maliciously crafted payload into the Inet Address field. Successful exploitation results in the server crashing and becoming entirely unrecoverable due to the malformed payload being persistently written into the standalone.xml configuration file.\nThe risk implication is severe, as the crash causes complete service disruption, necessitating manual administrative intervention on the host filesystem to clean the configuration file and restore normal server operations. The attacker capabilities required for this vulnerability include remote network access and valid administrative credentials to interact with the Management Model. Exploitation does not require code execution privileges beyond the administrative role, but it effectively weaponizes administrative interfaces to induce persistent system failure.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the input handling mechanism of the Inet Address field within the Management Model of wildfly-core. The root cause is an inadequate input validation and sanitization failure when processing administrative configuration updates submitted via the management interface. When an attacker supplies a malformed payload tailored for the Inet Address field, the management subsystem fails to validate the syntactic and semantic correctness of the input before committing the change.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker establishes an authenticated session with the management interface using valid administrative credentials. Second, the attacker issues a management request containing the malformed payload targeted at the Inet Address configuration parameter. Third, the management subsystem accepts the input and persists the unvalidated data directly into the standalone.xml configuration file without rejecting the anomalous structure. Finally, upon subsequent server initialization or runtime evaluation of the configuration, the application attempts to parse the corrupted standalone.xml file, encounters a fatal parsing or initialization exception due to the malformed Inet Address entry, and crashes.\nBecause the malformed payload is written persistently to the disk-based configuration file, the server enters a crash loop or fails to start upon reboot, resulting in a persistent denial of service. Remediation requires out-of-band manual intervention, where an administrator must access the host system, locate the standalone.xml file, identify and remove the injected payload, and restart the service. The vulnerable component is the configuration management parser handling Inet Address properties. Attack requirements mandate network exposure of the management interface and possession of administrative authentication credentials."
}