Description

HCL Hive is affected by an information exposure vulnerability where Swagger documentation was found exposed publicly.  Although no sensitive information (e.g., credentials, PII) was discovered, exposing API documentation to unauthenticated users can increase the overall attack surface.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-24T13:17:32.703Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-24T13:17:32.703Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An information exposure vulnerability has been identified in HCL Hive, specifically involving the public exposure of Swagger API documentation to unauthenticated network entities. This security deficiency allows unauthorized external actors to inspect and map the underlying application programming interface endpoints, schemas, parameters, and methods supported by the service. Although active enumeration of the exposed interface did not reveal sensitive data such as hardcoded credentials or personally identifiable information, the unintended disclosure of internal API architecture significantly broadens the reconnaissance surface of the application. The risk implications primarily center on facilitating advanced threat actor reconnaissance, enabling the formulation of targeted secondary attacks against undocumented, legacy, or vulnerable endpoints. The capability required by an attacker is minimal, requiring only standard HTTP request tooling and network connectivity to the exposed documentation resource without necessitating prior authentication or elevated privileges. Remediation requires restricting public access to the Swagger UI and API specification endpoints through proper authentication mechanisms or network-level access controls.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from the misconfiguration or default deployment behavior of the HCL Hive application, which fails to restrict access to the Swagger documentation component. The vulnerable component is the API documentation server-side handler responsible for rendering OpenAPI or Swagger specifications to clients. From a network exposure perspective, the endpoint is publicly accessible over standard web protocols to unauthenticated users, requiring no prior privileges to query or retrieve the complete API schema.\nThe root cause is the absence of access control lists, authentication checks, or environment-based conditional compilation that would typically disable or gate developer-centric documentation interfaces in production environments. During exploitation, an unauthorized user initiates a standard HTTP GET request against the exposed Swagger UI or JSON/YAML specification path. The application processes the request without validating session tokens or API keys and returns the complete API catalog. This payload provides the adversary with a comprehensive blueprint of the application's backend architecture, including internal routing logic, parameter types, expected data formats, and auxiliary API endpoints.\nThe attack flow follows a passive-to-active reconnaissance methodology. First, the attacker discovers the exposed Swagger interface either through automated web path fuzzing or by inspecting standard deployment paths. Second, the adversary harvests the API specification to identify high-value or administrative endpoints that may lack robust authorization controls. Third, leveraging the detailed parameter structures obtained from the documentation, the attacker crafts customized payloads to probe these backend functions for input validation flaws, injection vulnerabilities, or broken object-level authorization defects. The post-exploitation impact includes the potential discovery of hidden functionality or insecure direct object references that can be leveraged to compromise data integrity or confidentiality."
}