Description

In aidl, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11185216; Issue ID: MSV-9039.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-05T02:16:52.393Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-05T02:16:52.393Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists within the Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL) implementation, identified by Issue ID MSV-9039 and Patch ID ALPS11185216.\nThe vulnerability stems from a failure to implement mandatory permission checks when facilitating inter-process communication (IPC) via AIDL interfaces.\nThis security defect allows a malicious actor who has already secured System-level privileges to perform unauthorized actions or escalate capabilities further within the system architecture.\nExploitation does not require user interaction, making it a significant concern for localized security boundaries.\nThe primary risk implication is the potential for an attacker to bypass intended access control mechanisms, leveraging established system-level access to gain deeper control over the Android framework or hardware-abstraction layers.\nThe vulnerability is localized to the AIDL communication layer, which is integral to the Android operating system's request-handling mechanism between service components.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the absence of a proper permission enforcement check within an exposed AIDL interface implementation. In the Android security model, AIDL interfaces are used to define the contract for IPC between a client application and a remote service. When a service exposes an interface via AIDL, it is responsible for verifying that the calling process possesses the required Android permissions (typically defined in the AndroidManifest.xml) before executing privileged operations.\nIn this specific instance, the service fails to validate the caller's identity or authorization status, effectively treating incoming requests as trusted regardless of the source. Because the AIDL interface serves as a gateway to service-level functionality, the lack of an `enforceCallingPermission()` or `checkCallingPermission()` invocation allows unauthorized code execution within the context of the service.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: A malicious application identifies an exported AIDL service that lacks the necessary access control checks. The attacker constructs an IPC request targeted at the vulnerable service methods. Since the service performs no permission validation upon receiving the binder transaction, it executes the requested method with its own security context (often that of the System process). By sending a carefully crafted payload, the attacker can force the system service to perform unintended operations on behalf of the caller.\nAlthough the vulnerability specifies that the attacker must have already obtained System-level privilege, this condition allows for a 'privilege chain' where the attacker escalates from standard System access to broader unauthorized actions that should otherwise be gated by specific, granular Android permissions (e.g., signature-level permissions).\nPost-exploitation, an attacker can perform arbitrary actions defined within the vulnerable AIDL interface, which may include modifying system properties, interacting with sensitive device hardware, or bypassing existing software restrictions. The lack of requirement for user interaction ensures that the exploit can be triggered silently in the background, minimizing the chances of detection by the end user or standard security monitoring tools."
}