Description

A flaw has been found in alldatacenter alldata up to 0.6.8. This impacts the function FileInputStream of the file /admin/controller/JobLogController.java of the component logDetailCat Endpoint. This manipulation of the argument executorAddress causes path traversal. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project closed the issue report as "not planned" without any further explanation.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-14T14:16:50.723Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-14T14:16:50.723Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A path traversal vulnerability has been identified in alldatacenter alldata versions up to 0.6.8. The security flaw specifically resides within the logDetailCat endpoint, mapping to the FileInputStream function inside the /admin/controller/JobLogController.java file.\nThe vulnerability allows remote, unauthenticated or authenticated attackers to manipulate the executorAddress argument, leading to arbitrary file read capabilities through directory traversal techniques.\nSuccessful exploitation of this flaw can result in the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive system files and application data stored on the host server.\nThe risk is significantly elevated due to the public availability of an exploit, enabling threat actors to weaponize the flaw without requiring advanced privileges.\nDespite the disclosure, the vendor marked the issue report as \"not planned,\" leaving deployments unpatched by official means and requiring manual remediation.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from improper input validation and sanitization within the Java-based backend controller handling job logs. Specifically, the vulnerable component is located in /admin/controller/JobLogController.java under the logDetailCat endpoint.\nThe root cause of the flaw is the insecure usage of the FileInputStream function, which directly or indirectly processes the executorAddress argument supplied by the user without adequately restricting the file path context.\nAttack flow begins when a remote threat actor crafts an HTTP request targeting the logDetailCat endpoint. By injecting directory traversal sequences (such as dot-dot-slash sequences like ../) into the executorAddress parameter, the attacker can break out of the intended logging directory.\nWhen the application passes this maliciously crafted parameter to the FileInputStream constructor, the underlying operating system resolves the path outside the intended boundary, accessing arbitrary files on the filesystem that the application process has read permissions to access.\nNetwork exposure is remote, as the endpoint is accessible over the network, allowing external entities to initiate the attack without prior local access.\nThe attack mechanism requires no complex prerequisites beyond network connectivity to the vulnerable endpoint and knowledge of the target file paths. The published exploit automates this parameter manipulation to retrieve sensitive files.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the potential exposure of configuration files, source code, system credentials, or other sensitive operating system files, severely compromising the confidentiality of the host environment."
}