Description

Missing authorization in the Execute Monitor API in Amazon OpenSearch Alerting plugin might allow an authenticated remote user to read, modify, or delete arbitrary index data via a crafted inline monitor request with unintentional data source and input index parameters.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-12T19:17:31.660Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-12T19:17:31.660Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A missing authorization vulnerability has been identified in the Execute Monitor API within the Amazon OpenSearch Alerting plugin. This security flaw enables an authenticated remote user to bypass access control mechanisms and perform unauthorized data operations, specifically the capability to read, modify, or delete arbitrary index data.\nThe vulnerability affects systems utilizing the Amazon OpenSearch Alerting plugin where strict authorization checks on the Execute Monitor API are inadequately enforced. The risk implications are severe regarding data confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as unauthorized users can manipulate indices outside their designated security scope.\nExploitation of this vulnerability requires the attacker to be authenticated against the OpenSearch cluster and possess the capability to submit requests to the vulnerable API endpoint. The attack vector relies on crafting specific malicious inputs rather than complex multi-stage exploitation.\nThreat actors leverage this flaw by supplying a crafted inline monitor request containing unintentional data source and input index parameters. By manipulating these parameters, the attacker tricks the application into processing operations on unauthorized indices, thereby executing unintended data reads, modifications, or deletions through the context of the alerting execution engine.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from insufficient access control validation and authorization enforcement within the Execute Monitor API of the Amazon OpenSearch Alerting plugin. When a user submits an inline monitor request, the underlying component fails to adequately validate whether the authenticated caller possesses the necessary permissions to access, modify, or delete the specified data sources and input indices.\nThe vulnerable component is the Execute Monitor API endpoint implemented by the Amazon OpenSearch Alerting plugin. The affected functionality processes inline monitor definitions that accept dynamic parameters governing data sources and target input indices.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacker must possess valid credentials to access the OpenSearch cluster, classifying this as an authenticated remote vulnerability. However, standard privilege boundaries are bypassed due to the missing authorization checks specific to the targeted API functionality.\nThe attack flow proceeds in a step-wise manner. First, the authenticated attacker crafts a malicious inline monitor request targeting the Execute Monitor API. Within this request, the attacker specifies arbitrary or unauthorized data source and input index parameters that fall outside their assigned security roles or least-privilege boundaries.\nSecond, the OpenSearch Alerting plugin parses the incoming inline monitor payload. Due to the lack of stringent authorization checks, the application fails to verify if the execution context or the calling user is authorized to interact with the specified data sources and input indices.\nThird, the alerting engine executes the monitor logic using the attacker-supplied parameters. This execution allows the attacker to force the system to perform read operations, data modifications, or deletions against arbitrary indices that the user should normally be restricted from accessing.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes unauthorized data exfiltration resulting from arbitrary index reads, data corruption or destruction via unauthorized modifications and deletions, and potential compromise of overall cluster integrity depending on the scope of the manipulated indices."
}