Description

Use after free in Views in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-06T22:16:59.703Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-06T22:16:59.703Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical security vulnerability involving a use-after-free condition exists in the Views component of Google Chrome prior to version 151.0.7922.109. This memory corruption flaw allows a remote attacker who has already compromised the renderer process to potentially execute a sandbox escape via a specially crafted HTML page.\nThe vulnerability represents a severe risk to client-side security as successful exploitation breaches the foundational security boundary of the browser architecture, specifically the browser sandbox designed to isolate untrusted web content from the underlying operating system.\nThe attack vector requires the target to process a malicious HTML payload capable of leveraging the renderer compromise to trigger the use-after-free condition within the browser process. Given the critical severity rating assigned by Chromium security, immediate remediation is strongly advised to prevent arbitrary code execution outside the restricted renderer sandbox environment.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in a use-after-free memory management defect within the Views UI component of Google Chrome. A use-after-free condition occurs when an application continues to use a pointer after the memory block it references has been deallocated or freed. This typically results from dangling pointers that are not properly nullified after object destruction, leading to undefined behavior and potential memory corruption.\nThe affected component is the Views framework, which is responsible for managing windows, widgets, and UI controls within the browser process. In the context of the Chrome multi-process architecture, the renderer process operates within a tightly locked-down sandbox to mitigate the impact of drive-by compromises. However, this vulnerability can be leveraged by an attacker who has already achieved code execution within the compromised renderer process.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker compromises the renderer process through a separate vulnerability or malicious interaction. Second, the attacker supplies a crafted HTML page containing a payload designed to interact with the Views component in the browser process via specific IPC (Inter-Process Communication) channels or shared state. Third, the interaction triggers the improper handling of object lifecycles, causing the application to reference a freed memory location within the Views component. Fourth, by carefully manipulating the heap layout (heap grooming or spraying), the attacker can replace the freed memory structure with controlled data.\nWhen the application subsequently attempts to dereference the dangling pointer, it executes attacker-controlled data as code or manipulates program execution flow. This grants the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code outside the restricted renderer sandbox, effectively achieving a sandbox escape and gaining elevated privileges within the context of the user running the browser process."
}