Description

Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key vulnerability in AKIN Software Computer Import-Export Industry and Trade Co. Ltd. OctoCloud allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs. This issue affects OctoCloud: from 1.12.06 before 1.12.07.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-08T12:17:17.500Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-08T12:17:17.500Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The OctoCloud platform, developed by AKIN Software Computer Import-Export Industry and Trade Co. Ltd., contains a critical authorization bypass vulnerability stemming from improper access control validation.\nThe vulnerability allows an unauthenticated or unauthorized attacker to manipulate user-controlled keys to access restricted application functionality.\nThis flaw bypasses the intended Access Control Lists (ACLs) enforced by the software, effectively granting unauthorized users the ability to perform actions reserved for higher-privileged accounts.\nThe impact includes potential unauthorized data access, system manipulation, and complete compromise of administrative functionality within the affected OctoCloud environment.\nThis vulnerability is present in versions 1.12.06 through 1.12.07.\nOrganizations using the affected software are at high risk, as exploitation requires minimal technical overhead and does not necessarily require prior authentication, depending on the implementation of the exposed API endpoints.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in an insecure implementation of access control mechanisms where the application relies on user-supplied input to validate authorization status.\nSpecifically, the application architecture fails to verify the integrity and origin of the user-controlled key against the server-side session state or identity provider database.\nInstead of validating requests against a robust, server-side ACL management system, the software architecture permits the client to influence the authorization decision process.\nBy manipulating these keys, an attacker can coerce the application into processing requests as if they originated from an authorized or administrative entity.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies the API endpoint or application function that checks authorization based on a user-provided key. Second, the attacker analyzes the request structure to determine the format and generation process of the key. Third, the attacker generates or intercepts a key corresponding to a higher-privileged user or constructs a malicious key that fails to trigger the ACL constraints.\nFinally, the attacker transmits the crafted request to the vulnerable component. Because the application logic incorrectly trusts the user-supplied key, it fails to perform a secondary, server-side validation against the requesting user's identity, resulting in the successful bypass of security constraints.\nThe vulnerable component is within the central authorization framework of OctoCloud, which processes incoming requests across various interface modules. The lack of server-side enforcement means that any functionality protected by these flawed ACL checks becomes reachable.\nThe affected versions include 1.12.06 and any minor revisions prior to 1.12.07. This vulnerability is not dependent on specific network exposure configurations, as it resides within the application layer logic, although instances accessible over the public internet are at immediate risk of exploitation.\nPost-exploitation, an attacker can interact with restricted functionalities such as administrative dashboards, configuration settings, or private data retrieval modules, leading to a total loss of confidentiality and integrity within the context of the OctoCloud platform."
}