Description

IBM OpenBMC FW1060.00 through FW1060.80 is affected by a vulnerability in the BMC firmware update process. An attacker with authenticated administrator-level access to the BMC can, under specific conditions, execute arbitrary code, resulting in a confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-19T21:16:54.663Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-19T21:16:54.663Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An arbitrary code execution vulnerability has been identified within the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) firmware update process of IBM OpenBMC FW1060.00 through FW1060.80.\nThis vulnerability allows a malicious actor possessing authenticated administrator-level access to execute arbitrary code on the affected system under specific conditions.\nSuccessful exploitation of this security flaw results in a comprehensive compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, potentially granting the attacker complete control over the BMC subsystem.\nThe risk implication is severe, as the BMC operates with privileged access to the underlying hardware and operating system, allowing deep persistent access to the server infrastructure.\nThe primary exploitation requirement is prior acquisition of administrator-level authentication credentials and interaction with specific operational conditions governing the BMC firmware update mechanism.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the BMC firmware update process of IBM OpenBMC versions FW1060.00 through FW1060.80, specifically within the subsystem responsible for parsing, validating, and applying firmware update packages.\nThe root cause stems from improper validation or insecure handling of update payloads during the update execution phase, allowing an attacker with high privileges to inject and execute arbitrary instructions.\nPrerequisites for exploitation mandate that the threat actor has already acquired administrative-level authentication to the BMC interface, lowering the immediate attack surface to privileged internal users or compromised administrative sessions.\nThe attack flow begins when the authenticated administrator supplies a maliciously crafted firmware update package or interacts with the update vector under targeted operational conditions.\nDue to insufficient validation checks within the firmware update component, the update routine processes the malicious payload, failing to sanitize or restrict executable components contained within the package.\nAs the update process proceeds, the system executes the injected arbitrary code within the context of the BMC firmware update routine.\nPost-exploitation impact includes full compromise of the BMC, allowing the attacker to manipulate hardware sensors, monitor system health, intercept console redirection, and potentially compromise the host operating system or hypervisor layer.\nNetwork exposure depends on the BMC management interface accessibility, while privilege requirements are strictly defined as authenticated administrator-level access."
}