Description

IBM Documentation Offline 1.0.0 through 1.4.1 could allow a remote attacker to forge valid session tokens due to the use of a hardcoded cryptographic key.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T21:17:42.943Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T21:17:42.943Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves the use of a hardcoded cryptographic key within IBM Documentation Offline versions 1.0.0 through 1.4.1, classified primarily as a cryptographic flaw leading to session forgery. The presence of a static, hardcoded key across installations allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to bypass standard authentication mechanisms by cryptographically forging valid session tokens. The risk implications are severe, as successful exploitation grants unauthorized access to sensitive application data and administrative functions, undermining the integrity of the session management subsystem. The attacker capability required is remote network access, with exploitation contingent upon the predictability and extraction of the embedded cryptographic secret. Because the key is hardcoded within the application binary or configuration files, no prior authentication or specialized privileges are required to initiate the attack flow. Remediation requires updating to a patched version or removing hardcoded secrets from the codebase to enforce cryptographically secure, dynamically generated session management.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the improper implementation of cryptographic functions, specifically the reliance on a hardcoded cryptographic key utilized for generating and signing session tokens within IBM Documentation Offline 1.0.0 through 1.4.1. In cryptographic architectures, session tokens or JSON Web Tokens (JWT) must be signed using high-entropy, dynamically generated keys stored securely and uniquely per deployment instance. When developers embed static cryptographic keys directly into the source code or static assets, the security of the entire session management infrastructure collapses if the key is discovered or reverse-engineered.\nThe exploitation method leverages the static nature of the embedded key. A remote attacker with network exposure to the vulnerable application can inspect the client-side code, binary files, or installation packages of IBM Documentation Offline to extract the hardcoded cryptographic secret. Armed with this static key, the attacker can construct arbitrary session payloads, modify user identity claims, and sign the resulting tokens using the extracted key. Because the server-side validation logic relies on the same hardcoded key to verify token integrity, it accepts the forged tokens as authentic.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker acquires a copy of the vulnerable IBM Documentation Offline software or intercepts application traffic to identify the token signing mechanism. Second, the attacker extracts the hardcoded cryptographic key from the application's static resources or binary code. Third, the attacker crafts a malicious session token containing elevated privileges or targeting a specific user context. Fourth, the attacker signs the crafted token using the extracted cryptographic key to ensure it passes HMAC or asymmetric signature verification checks. Fifth, the attacker transmits the forged session token to the target application via HTTP headers or cookies, successfully bypassing authentication.\nThe vulnerable component is the cryptographic token generation and validation module responsible for establishing user sessions. The affected versions strictly comprise IBM Documentation Offline 1.0.0 through 1.4.1. The attack vector is entirely network-based, requiring no authentication or prior privileges. The post-exploitation impact includes complete session hijacking, unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the local or enterprise environment hosting the documentation instance."
}