Description

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to server-side request forgery.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:55.557Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:55.557Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in IBM API Connect, affecting versions 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2.\nThe vulnerability resides in the application's request handling logic, enabling a remote authenticated attacker to influence the server to initiate unauthorized HTTP requests to internal or external resources.\nBy manipulating request parameters, an attacker can bypass network security controls to interact with internal services that are not typically exposed to the public internet.\nSuccessful exploitation allows for the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information residing within the internal network infrastructure.\nThis vulnerability requires the attacker to possess authenticated access to the system, limiting the attack surface to authorized users or those who have compromised valid credentials.\nDue to the nature of SSRF, the impact is primarily associated with the exposure of internal data, potential reconnaissance of internal network architecture, and potential interaction with internal APIs or management interfaces that rely on implicit trust based on network location.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from improper validation and sanitization of user-supplied input used in server-side request generation. IBM API Connect, in the specified versions, fails to adequately restrict the destination of requests initiated by the application backend when processing certain user-provided payloads.\nIn a standard SSRF attack flow, the attacker identifies an endpoint within the IBM API Connect platform that accepts a URL or a similar resource identifier as a parameter. By injecting a crafted URI pointing to an internal resource (e.g., http://127.0.0.1:port/ or http://internal-service/path), the attacker forces the backend server to execute the request on their behalf.\nBecause the server originates the request, it often bypasses perimeter firewalls, access control lists (ACLs), or network segmentation that would normally prevent an external client from reaching these internal resources.\nThe root cause is the lack of a robust allowlist or validation mechanism to ensure the target destination is legitimate and safe. The application treats the input as a trusted destination, allowing the attacker to probe the internal network's attack surface, perform port scanning of local services, or retrieve sensitive metadata and configuration files.\nAuthentication is a prerequisite for this exploit, meaning the adversary must first establish a valid session within the API Connect ecosystem. Once authenticated, the attacker utilizes their existing privileges to trigger the vulnerable function. The scope of the post-exploitation impact is limited by the service account's permissions and the visibility of the backend infrastructure from the server's perspective.\nPayload behavior typically involves supplying a malicious URI to an API call or administrative function. The vulnerable component processes this input, passes it to the underlying request handler, and receives the response from the internal target, which may then be relayed back to the attacker or stored in a logs/debugging output. This mechanism effectively turns the server into an proxy for the attacker, facilitating unauthorized information disclosure and circumventing intended architectural security boundaries."
}