Description

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote attacker to bypass authentication and assign arbitrary roles due to improper verification of cryptographic signatures.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:51.560Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:51.560Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM API Connect versions 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are susceptible to an authentication bypass vulnerability stemming from improper cryptographic signature verification.\nThis security flaw allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to circumvent standard security controls and assign arbitrary administrative or functional roles to themselves within the API management environment.\nThe vulnerability represents a critical risk as it grants unauthorized actors the ability to escalate privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise, sensitive data exfiltration, and unauthorized management of API lifecycles.\nExploitation does not require prior authentication, making it a high-risk vector for remote attackers capable of interacting with the API Connect interface.\nThe core issue lies in the failure of the application to correctly validate the integrity and authenticity of the tokens or requests processed, enabling the injection of malicious claims or the manipulation of role-based access control (RBAC) mechanisms.\nOrganizations utilizing the affected versions should prioritize immediate remediation to prevent unauthorized access and potential system manipulation.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the authentication and authorization middleware of IBM API Connect. The root cause is identified as improper validation of cryptographic signatures during the processing of incoming authentication requests or identity tokens.\nIn a secure implementation, the system must cryptographically verify that the signature attached to a token or request matches the expected payload signed by a trusted issuer. In the affected versions, the validation logic fails to sufficiently confirm the integrity of these signatures.\nAn attacker can exploit this flaw by crafting a specially formed request containing a forged or manipulated identity token. By circumventing the signature verification process, the attacker can present claims to the application that are accepted as legitimate despite not being issued by a trusted entity.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies the entry point for authentication requests within the API Connect management plane. Second, the attacker generates a malicious payload where the user identity and role assignment fields are modified to grant elevated privileges (e.g., Administrator). Third, because the system does not properly verify the cryptographic signature of the forged token, the authentication middleware incorrectly treats the attacker as an authorized user with the specified elevated roles.\nOnce the forged payload is accepted, the application updates the session context to reflect the attacker's elevated role. This bypass effectively ignores the intended Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policies, granting the attacker the permissions associated with the arbitrarily assigned roles.\nThe lack of robust signature verification means that any remote attacker with network access to the target API Connect instance can execute this exploit without needing valid credentials or pre-existing session state. Post-exploitation, the attacker gains the ability to interact with the API Connect management interface, potentially allowing them to modify API configurations, delete security policies, access backend service definitions, or intercept sensitive information routed through the gateway.\nThis vulnerability highlights a critical failure in the verification chain of identity management components, specifically during the deserialization and processing of signed authentication tokens. The impact is severe due to the ease with which an attacker can escalate privileges to the highest levels of the product's administrative hierarchy."
}