Description

IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to improper authorization via user-controlled keys.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:44.260Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:44.260Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an improper authorization flaw within IBM API Connect, affecting versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2. The security weakness enables a remote, authenticated attacker to bypass intended authorization controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive information.\nThe vulnerability manifests due to improper validation of user-controlled keys, which allows an attacker to manipulate parameters or requests to access data they are not authorized to view. This represents a significant risk to data confidentiality, as it potentially exposes API metadata, configuration details, or sensitive backend information.\nExploitation requires the attacker to have valid authentication within the environment, though they do not need higher-level administrative privileges to perform the unauthorized data retrieval. The impact is primarily categorized as an information disclosure vulnerability. Organizations relying on affected versions of IBM API Connect are at risk of data leakage if internal or external users perform malicious request manipulation. There is no indication that this vulnerability allows for remote code execution or complete system compromise; however, the unauthorized access to sensitive information can facilitate further reconnaissance or lateral movement within the API ecosystem.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper authorization logic within the IBM API Connect platform, specifically concerning the handling of user-controlled keys during API request processing. The system fails to correctly validate or enforce authorization boundaries when these keys are provided in requests, enabling an authenticated user to perform operations or access resources that fall outside their assigned security scope.\nTechnically, the vulnerability originates within the API Connect authorization and access control framework. When an authenticated user submits a request containing specific user-controlled keys, the application fails to perform a rigorous check to ensure the user possesses the necessary permissions to access the resource linked to those keys. This is indicative of a flaw in the backend authorization module, where the server implicitly trusts the integrity of the user-provided keys rather than independently verifying the user's authorization against a centralized Access Control List (ACL) or policy engine.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker must obtain a valid authenticated session within the IBM API Connect environment. Second, the attacker identifies specific API endpoints or management interfaces that process user-controlled keys. Third, the attacker crafts a malicious request by manipulating these keys—likely by substituting known identifiers or guessing target resource keys—and injects them into the API request parameters or headers. Because the vulnerable component neglects to perform a cross-reference between the authenticated identity and the requested resource keys, the application treats the malicious request as legitimate and retrieves the requested information. The system then returns the sensitive data in the HTTP response, effectively bypassing the expected multi-tenancy or role-based access control (RBAC) restrictions.\nAffected versions are strictly limited to IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2. The exposure is inherently network-based, as the attacker must be capable of reaching the API Connect interface to submit the malformed request. The primary post-exploitation impact is the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive API metadata or information, which could be leveraged to map the internal API structure, identify backend systems, or gain access to proprietary data schemas. This vulnerability underscores a failure in the 'Secure by Default' design principle regarding key-based authorization verification."
}