Description

IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote attacker to perform server-side request forgery due to improper validation of user-supplied input.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:40.743Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:40.743Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM API Connect versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are susceptible to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. This flaw arises from the improper validation of user-supplied input during request processing. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this weakness to force the application to make unauthorized requests to internal or external resources. The successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to the exposure of sensitive internal data, unauthorized access to restricted backend services, or the potential for further reconnaissance within the internal network infrastructure. Given the critical nature of API gateways, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the services protected by the platform.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in the failure of the IBM API Connect request handling logic to adequately sanitize or validate input parameters that govern downstream service discovery or request forwarding. In environments where API gateways act as intermediaries, input fields are often used to define target endpoints or proxy destinations. When these inputs lack strict allow-listing or URI normalization, the gateway becomes an unintended proxy for malicious traffic.\nThe attack flow begins when an attacker identifies an endpoint or service within IBM API Connect that accepts user-defined URLs or host parameters. By injecting arbitrary internal loopback addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1, localhost) or internal network range addresses (e.g., 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) into these fields, the attacker coerces the server into initiating an outbound request on behalf of the application.\nThe vulnerable component resides within the request processing engine of the API management layer. Because the requests originate from the API Connect server, they are often implicitly trusted by other internal microservices or legacy backend systems that reside behind the firewall. This effectively allows the attacker to bypass network perimeter security controls.\nExploitation does not require authentication in instances where the vulnerable API endpoint is exposed to the public-facing gateway interface. Once the request is initiated, the server processes the forged request as its own, potentially returning the response to the attacker or executing actions on backend systems. Post-exploitation impact includes the ability to perform port scanning of internal infrastructure, retrieve metadata from cloud environment services (such as IMDS in AWS/Azure/GCP), or interact with administrative interfaces that are not intended to be exposed to external actors. The severity is compounded by the privileged network position of the API Connect platform, which typically enjoys broad connectivity to sensitive backend environments."
}