Description

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to server-side request forgery. User-supplied addresses are not sufficiently validated, so the server could be made to send requests to unintended destinations and return the results.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:35.177Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:35.177Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM API Connect versions 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are susceptible to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.\nThe flaw exists due to insufficient validation of user-supplied addresses, enabling a remote authenticated attacker to force the server to initiate requests to arbitrary, unintended network destinations.\nSuccessful exploitation allows attackers to bypass network perimeters, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive internal resources or services that are not directly exposed to the public internet.\nThe vulnerability requires the attacker to be authenticated to the target API Connect environment, which limits the initial attack vector but presents a significant risk to internal infrastructure integrity.\nThe impact includes the potential for information disclosure, unauthorized interaction with internal metadata services, and lateral movement within the service architecture.\nOrganizations using the specified versions should assess their exposure and prioritize upgrading to a secure version to neutralize the SSRF vector.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in a lack of strict input sanitization and validation logic concerning URI or address parameters handled by the IBM API Connect server-side components. When the application processes user-supplied addresses, it fails to enforce an allowlist of permitted hosts or apply sufficient filtering to prevent requests targeting internal loopback addresses or protected network segments.\nThis SSRF vulnerability functions by manipulating the server into acting as a proxy or intermediary. An authenticated attacker can craft a request containing a malicious target URL within an API parameter. Because the application logic does not sufficiently validate the input before initiating an outbound connection, the server's backend processes are forced to fetch resources or execute commands at the attacker-specified destination.\nThe attack flow typically follows these steps: 1) An authenticated user identifies an API endpoint that performs server-side fetching or proxying of external resources. 2) The attacker injects a target payload (e.g., an internal IP address, a cloud metadata service URL, or internal infrastructure hostnames) into the input field intended for the destination address. 3) The application, executing with the server's identity, attempts to resolve and connect to this address. 4) The application returns the response or side-effect of the request to the attacker, or utilizes the request to trigger secondary actions within the internal network.\nThe scope of impact is highly dependent on the network environment in which IBM API Connect is deployed. In cloud-hosted instances, this vulnerability is particularly critical, as it may allow an attacker to reach the cloud provider's Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). By querying these internal APIs, an attacker might extract sensitive information such as dynamic identity credentials, temporary API keys, or machine configurations, leading to full compromise of the cloud instance.\nFurthermore, in traditional data center deployments, the SSRF primitive can be utilized to port scan internal networks, interact with non-public administrative interfaces (e.g., management consoles, internal databases), or bypass firewall rules that rely on source-based authentication. Because the requests originate from a trusted internal server, they may circumvent traditional access controls designed for public-facing components. Authentication is a prerequisite for this exploit, meaning the attacker must already possess valid credentials; however, this does not negate the severity, as it represents a significant escalation of privilege and lateral movement capability."
}