Description

IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a path traversal vulnerability.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:32.657Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:32.657Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM API Connect versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are susceptible to a critical path traversal vulnerability that facilitates arbitrary code execution.\nThis vulnerability is categorized as a path traversal flaw, which allows a remote, authenticated attacker to manipulate file system paths to access unauthorized directories or execute malicious payloads.\nBy bypassing intended input validation mechanisms, an attacker can traverse the directory structure of the host environment to read, write, or execute files outside of the defined application boundaries.\nSuccessful exploitation allows an adversary to achieve remote code execution, compromising the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the IBM API Connect environment.\nThe vulnerability requires that the attacker has established authenticated access to the system, acting as a significant escalation vector for users with existing low-level credentials.\nGiven the nature of API management platforms, the impact of such a compromise is severe, potentially granting the attacker full control over the gateway functions and internal configuration data.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the file handling or path processing logic of IBM API Connect versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2.\nThe root cause of this flaw is the insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input used in file system operations. When the application processes requests, it fails to adequately validate or normalize paths provided in specific API calls or interface inputs.\nAn authenticated attacker can leverage this weakness by injecting directory traversal sequences—typically represented as '../' patterns—into input fields that interface with the underlying operating system's file system API.\nThe exploitation flow begins with the attacker identifying a vulnerable endpoint that accepts file paths or resource identifiers. By crafting a request containing manipulated path parameters, the attacker forces the application to resolve files located outside the intended scope of the application's root directory.\nWhen the server-side process resolves these malicious paths, it may treat uploaded, downloaded, or processed content as legitimate application files. If the environment is configured to allow the execution of scripts or binaries from these directories, the attacker can upload a malicious payload to a predictable location and subsequently trigger its execution via the path traversal mechanism.\nThe vulnerability operates effectively in remote configurations where the attacker has authenticated session access. Because the application fails to enforce rigid chroot-like environments or strict path-checking routines, the process running the IBM API Connect service executes the attacker's payload with the same permissions assigned to the service account.\nPost-exploitation, an attacker can gain persistent access, exfiltrate sensitive configuration files, modify gateway policies, or pivot deeper into the internal network infrastructure hosted by the affected API Connect deployment.\nThe lack of robust input normalization allows the evasion of standard security filters, as the traversal sequences are often processed by the backend logic after standard web application firewall (WAF) checks might have already parsed the input, rendering the application logic itself the primary failure point."
}