Description

IBM AIX 7.2, and 7.3 and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1 could allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary commands due to improper validation of the ODMDIR environment variable.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-20T15:17:29.460Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-20T15:17:29.460Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an improper input validation flaw related to the Object Data Manager directory (ODMDIR) environment variable within IBM AIX and IBM PowerVM VIOS. The weakness allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, bypassing standard security controls.\nThe affected products include IBM AIX 7.2, IBM AIX 7.3, and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1. Successful exploitation poses severe risk implications for system integrity and confidentiality, as unauthorized command execution can lead to full system compromise.\nThe attack requires local access to the target system. An authenticated local attacker leverages inadequate sanitization of the ODMDIR environment variable to manipulate Object Data Manager operations, forcing the application or system utility to load malicious database files and execute arbitrary code.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from improper validation and handling of the ODMDIR environment variable by privileged binaries or administrative scripts within the affected operating systems. The ODMDIR variable specifies the path to the Object Data Manager (ODM) database directories, which store critical system configuration data.\nIn vulnerable versions of IBM AIX 7.2, IBM AIX 7.3, and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1, certain setuid/setgid programs or administrative utilities fail to appropriately sanitize or restrict the ODMDIR environment variable before querying ODM classes. Because these utilities often execute with elevated privileges, an attacker can supply a custom, locally crafted ODM database path via a manipulated ODMDIR environment variable.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the local attacker creates a malicious ODM database structure within a directory they control. This crafted database contains entries designed to invoke arbitrary payloads or commands when queried by system tools. Second, the attacker sets the ODMDIR environment variable to point to this malicious directory. Third, the attacker executes a vulnerable setuid or privileged system binary that relies on the ODM configuration.\nAs the utility initializes and queries the ODM path defined by the tainted ODMDIR variable, it processes the attacker-controlled database instead of the legitimate system repositories. Due to insufficient checks on environment inheritance and lack of path verification, the application executes the embedded malicious instructions with the privileges of the executing binary, typically resulting in local privilege escalation or arbitrary command execution.\nPrerequisites for this attack include local interactive or programmatic access to the host system and valid user credentials. No network exposure is required, as the vector is strictly local. The vulnerable components are the system binaries and administrative utilities interacting with the ODM subsystem without strict environment sanitization."
}