Description

IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information belonging to other tenants due to an injection vulnerability. Input used to build a data query is not properly neutralized, which could allow the query to return data the user is not permitted to see.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:22.067Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:22.067Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM API Connect versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are susceptible to an injection vulnerability that facilitates unauthorized cross-tenant data access.\nThe vulnerability stems from improper neutralization of user-supplied input used in backend data queries.\nA remote authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to manipulate query logic, circumventing tenant isolation boundaries to retrieve sensitive information belonging to other tenants.\nThe security impact is critical as it compromises the multi-tenancy model, leading to unauthorized disclosure of confidential data.\nSuccessful exploitation requires the attacker to possess authenticated access to the system, at which point they can leverage specifically crafted inputs to bypass authorization controls enforced by the application's query-building mechanisms.\nThis vulnerability highlights a systemic failure in input validation and query construction safety, necessitating immediate attention to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability resides in the application's query construction logic, specifically where user-provided input is incorporated into backend data queries without adequate sanitization or parameterized inputs.\nThe vulnerability manifests within the component responsible for processing API requests and interacting with the underlying data persistence layer. When a user submits an authenticated request, the application processes the input to construct a query intended to filter results based on the current user's tenant context.\nBecause the input is not properly neutralized, an attacker can supply malicious characters or query syntax that modifies the structure of the generated query. This is a classic injection vulnerability where the input is interpreted as code or query commands rather than data.\nThe attack flow follows these steps: 1. An authenticated attacker identifies an API endpoint or function that accepts user-defined filters or parameters. 2. The attacker crafts a payload designed to manipulate the query logic, for example, by injecting conditional operators such as 'OR 1=1' or equivalent syntax that effectively negates or ignores the mandatory tenant identification filter.\n3. The application concatenates this malicious input directly into the query string before submission to the database or data store. 4. The backend system executes the altered query, which no longer adheres to the intended tenant isolation restrictions.\n5. Consequently, the query returns a result set containing sensitive information that spans across multiple tenants, which the attacker then receives in the response.\nThe vulnerable component is the query generation engine within IBM API Connect versions 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2. The exploitation requires the attacker to be authenticated, meaning the attacker must have valid credentials within the environment. However, the attack does not require elevated administrative privileges; a standard authenticated user can perform the exploit to access data belonging to any other tenant configured in the system.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes the potential for significant data breaches, exposure of proprietary API definitions, credentials, or sensitive business data managed by other tenants within the shared IBM API Connect instance."
}