Description

The Tutor LMS – eLearning and online course solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution limited to zero-argument function invocation in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.5 via the tutor_course_filter_ajax AJAX action. This is due to missing authorization on the handler combined with unsanitized array keys being passed to extract() inside tutor_load_template(), allowing attacker-controlled POST data to overwrite the local $template variable and, in the resulting templates/single-content-loader.php template, the $method_map and $context variables invoked at $method_map[$context](). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to call an arbitrary zero-argument PHP function server-side and, via WordPress core edit_user(), to create a persistent subscriber-level account from request parameters.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-28T05:16:41.660Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-28T05:16:41.660Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in all versions up to and including 4.0.5 of the Tutor LMS plugin for WordPress. The security flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to invoke arbitrary zero-argument PHP functions on the hosting server. This capability stems from a lack of authorization verification on the tutor_course_filter_ajax AJAX action handler combined with insecure variable extraction practices. Successful exploitation can lead to site compromise, as attackers can abuse WordPress core functionalities to establish unauthorized persistent access.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability resides in the tutor_course_filter_ajax AJAX action handler, which fails to enforce access controls or verify the authorization of incoming requests. This endpoint facilitates the loading of templates by accepting user-supplied POST data and passing it to the tutor_load_template() function.\nWithin tutor_load_template(), the plugin uses PHP's extract() function on the unsanitized keys of the incoming POST array. Because extract() is called without restrictive flags, it overwrites existing variables in the local symbol table. An attacker can leverage this behavior to overwrite the local $template variable, forcing the application to load the templates/single-content-loader.php template file.\nThe loaded templates/single-content-loader.php file contains dynamic execution logic of the form $method_map[$context](). Because both $method_map and $context can be overwritten via the initial POST data payload, the attacker gains control over the function invoked at this point. However, because the syntax does not pass arguments, the execution is limited to zero-argument functions.\nFor post-exploitation, attackers can target WordPress core functions that process request parameters globally. By invoking the edit_user() function, an attacker can leverage global HTTP parameters to create a persistent subscriber-level account, bypassing standard registration controls and establishing a foothold on the target WordPress environment."
}