Description

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain valid access tokens for other users due to improper authentication. Authentication against a connected directory service is not sufficiently enforced, which could allow another user's identity to be assumed.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:21.883Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:21.883Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an improper authentication flaw within IBM API Connect, affecting versions 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2.\nThe core issue resides in the insufficient enforcement of authentication protocols when interacting with connected directory services.\nA remote attacker can leverage this weakness to successfully authenticate as another user, effectively hijacking existing user identities and obtaining valid access tokens.\nThe successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in unauthorized access to sensitive API resources and administrative functions, bypassing the intended security controls of the authentication framework.\nThe risk implication is severe, as it facilitates unauthorized impersonation and potential data exfiltration or manipulation within the API ecosystem.\nAttackers require network access to the API Connect management or developer portal interfaces to initiate the authentication request, though no advanced privileges are initially required to exploit the underlying flaw.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a logic error in the authentication processing mechanism of IBM API Connect when verifying credentials against an integrated directory service, such as LDAP or Active Directory.\nIn the affected versions (10.0.8.0-10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2), the system fails to strictly validate the integrity and mapping of authentication assertions returned by the external identity provider.\nSpecifically, the application logic does not adequately enforce binding between the successful response from the directory service and the user identity session being established. This leads to a scenario where the application erroneously trusts a response that does not correctly verify the credentials of the intended user, allowing the attacker to assume the identity of an arbitrary user account.\nThe exploitation flow begins with the attacker sending a crafted authentication request to the IBM API Connect authentication endpoint. Due to the improper enforcement, the system processes the request in a manner that bypasses secondary validation checks, leading the system to generate a cryptographically valid access token associated with a target user.\nOnce the attacker obtains this access token, they can present it to the API gateway or administrative dashboard. Because the token is signed and considered authentic by the system, the platform grants the attacker the same permissions and scope as the victim user.\nThis behavior exposes the entire API lifecycle management platform to full account takeover. The root cause is a failure to properly implement the 'check-after-auth' pattern required for external identity integration, resulting in a decoupling of the authentication handshake from the subsequent authorization grant. The exploitation requires no specific post-authentication privileges; the act of authentication itself is the vector of compromise. The vulnerability is network-exploitable, assuming the attacker has reachability to the authentication service interface, making this a critical flaw in identity management and access control."
}