Description

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions to access and modify sensitive information due to improper restriction of security token assignment.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-07T05:18:20.733Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-07T05:18:20.733Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM API Connect versions 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 are susceptible to a security bypass vulnerability resulting from improper restriction of security token assignment.\nThis vulnerability allows a remote, authenticated attacker to circumvent existing security constraints, facilitating unauthorized access to and modification of sensitive data within the API management environment.\nThe flaw originates from an insufficient validation or enforcement mechanism during the security token lifecycle, which an attacker can leverage to escalate privileges or bypass access control lists.\nThe risk is significant as it compromises the integrity and confidentiality of API interactions and configuration data stored within the platform.\nSuccessful exploitation requires the attacker to be authenticated to the system; however, the impact extends to the potential for illicit manipulation of sensitive information across the managed API ecosystem.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the core authentication and authorization management modules of IBM API Connect. The root cause is an improper restriction of security token assignment, which occurs when the system fails to correctly validate the scope or user association of a generated or processed token during session establishment or API request handling.\nBy manipulating the security token assignment process, an authenticated attacker can perform requests that fall outside their assigned security posture or permitted authorization boundaries. This typically involves the exploitation of the internal token issuance or validation logic where the system inadequately verifies the binding between the authenticated identity and the requested operation or resource.\nThe attack flow follows a structured exploitation path: first, the attacker maintains a legitimate, authenticated session with the platform. Second, they intercept or forge requests directed toward the management plane or API gateway functionality. Third, by leveraging the improper token assignment flaw, the attacker submits requests containing tokens that possess elevated or broad permissions not intended for their original authenticated context. If the system fails to verify that the token properly correlates with the identity's restrictive policies, the underlying service executes the request with the attacker's preferred privileges.\nThe impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it permits horizontal or vertical privilege escalation. An attacker may gain unauthorized access to administrative configuration settings, sensitive backend service definitions, or user-defined API policies. Furthermore, the ability to modify sensitive information allows for the injection of malicious code into API workflows, unauthorized alteration of API schemas, or the extraction of cryptographic material and API credentials managed within the system.\nThis vulnerability represents a breakdown in the Zero Trust architecture expected of an enterprise API gateway, where the validity of the token must be continuously and strictly enforced relative to the authenticated actor. Because the affected versions are critical components of an organization's API infrastructure, the exposure is significant, particularly in environments where multi-tenancy or delegation of administrative rights is practiced.\nExploitation is strictly remote and relies on the platform's API management protocols, requiring the attacker to interact directly with the vulnerable management interfaces or gateway endpoints. No client-side interaction is strictly necessary, as the attack is orchestrated through standard API request manipulation once the initial authentication barrier has been cleared."
}