Description

The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin before 6.2.8 does not correctly limit the number of second-factor verification attempts, tracking them against a client-supplied identifier that is reissued on every login, allowing an attacker who already knows a user's password to guess the one-time code without limit and take over the account.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-06T22:16:49.007Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-06T22:16:49.007Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin prior to version 6.2.8 suffers from a critical authentication bypass vulnerability stemming from insufficient rate limiting enforcement during the second-factor verification phase.\nThe flaw allows an unauthenticated or partially authenticated remote attacker who has already obtained a valid user's primary credentials (password) to execute an automated brute-force or credential-guessing attack against the One-Time Password (OTP) or second-factor verification mechanism without restriction.\nThe primary impact of this vulnerability is complete account takeover, enabling unauthorized access to victim accounts with potentially elevated privileges depending on the compromised user role.\nThe root cause lies in tracking verification attempts against a client-supplied identifier that is dynamically reissued upon every login attempt, effectively resetting the attempt counter and neutralizing traditional account lockout protections.\nSuccessful exploitation requires the attacker to possess prior knowledge of the target's primary password. No special privileges are required on the WordPress platform prior to the attack.\nImmediate remediation requires updating the miniOrange 2FA plugin to version 6.2.8 or later, where proper rate-limiting tracking mechanisms are implemented.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the multi-factor authentication handling logic of the miniOrange 2FA WordPress plugin affecting all versions prior to 6.2.8.\nThe root cause of the vulnerability is an improper authorization and state-tracking implementation during the second-factor verification stage.\nInstead of binding verification attempts to a server-side session, persistent user identifier, or cryptographically secure token tied to the active authentication context, the application tracks failed verification attempts against a client-supplied identifier.\nFurthermore, this client-supplied identifier is reissued and rotated on every login initialization attempt.\nAn attacker initiates the attack flow by supplying valid primary credentials (username and password) for a targeted user account during the initial authentication phase.\nUpon successful validation of the primary credentials, the application prompts the user for the second-factor verification code and issues a new client-supplied identifier intended to track the verification session.\nBecause the tracking identifier is controlled or reissued per login cycle and lacks proper server-side state enforcement, an attacker can script automated HTTP requests to submit continuous guesses for the one-time verification code.\nEach incorrect guess can be paired with a newly initialized login session or by exploiting the resetting mechanism of the client-supplied identifier, thereby bypassing any application-level lockout or rate-limiting controls that would typically restrict brute-force attacks.\nThe attack vector is network-based, exposing any WordPress instance running vulnerable versions of the miniOrange 2FA plugin to remote brute-force attacks over HTTP/HTTPS.\nThe prerequisite for successful exploitation is the prior compromise or knowledge of the victim's static password.\nUpon successfully guessing the second-factor verification code through unbounded enumeration, the attacker achieves full authentication bypass and subsequent account takeover.\nPost-exploitation impact includes unauthorized access to administrative or user-level capabilities, data exfiltration, and potential site compromise if an administrator account is targeted."
}