Description

IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 IBM DataStage could allow a remote authenticated attacker to perform an arbitrary file write due to improper validation of file paths.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T20:16:40.410Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T20:16:40.410Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical security vulnerability identified in IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 enables an authenticated remote attacker to perform arbitrary file write operations.\nThe vulnerability stems from improper validation of user-supplied file paths, allowing an attacker to bypass intended directory restrictions.\nSuccessful exploitation permits the attacker to write files to unauthorized locations within the underlying filesystem, potentially leading to remote code execution, system configuration modification, or the overwriting of sensitive application files.\nThis vulnerability requires the attacker to be authenticated to the DataStage environment. Given the potential for full system compromise or persistence, the risk level is significant.\nOrganizations deploying IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 must prioritize the identification of anomalous file operations and enforce strict access controls to limit the blast radius of authenticated users.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability exists due to a failure in the input validation mechanism for file path parameters within the IBM DataStage application. Specifically, the application fails to adequately sanitize or normalize user-provided file paths before utilizing them in file system operations. This vulnerability is characteristic of a path traversal or directory traversal flaw, where an attacker can supply sequences such as '../' or absolute path strings to break out of the intended root directory.\nThe root cause is the insufficient implementation of input validation filters on the server-side component responsible for handling file-based configurations or data output operations. Because the system trusts the path provided by the authenticated user, it fails to verify that the target destination is within the secure, designated directory tree.\nTo exploit this, an authenticated attacker initiates a request to the vulnerable service component that processes file path input. By manipulating the path parameter, the attacker can specify a destination outside of the sandbox. When the application executes the write operation using this maliciously crafted path, the underlying filesystem treats the input as a legitimate request, resulting in the file being written to an arbitrary location on the server's disk.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1) The attacker authenticates to the IBM DataStage environment using valid credentials. 2) The attacker identifies an endpoint or service that accepts a file path as an input parameter for processing, logging, or storage. 3) The attacker crafts a request containing an absolute or relative path designed to escape the application's root directory (e.g., /etc/passwd or application configuration files). 4) The application fails to validate the integrity of the path and proceeds to open a file handle at the attacker-defined location. 5) The attacker supplies the content payload which is then written to the unauthorized target path.\nThe post-exploitation impact is severe, as the ability to overwrite configuration files can lead to the disabling of security controls or the redirection of application flow. Furthermore, if the attacker targets executable scripts or system binaries, they may achieve remote code execution under the context of the service user, thereby gaining a foothold within the Cloud Pak for Data environment."
}