Description

The teddy-bear-customize-addon WordPress plugin through 1.0.5 does not perform any authorization or ownership checks before returning WooCommerce order metadata and the URLs of customer-uploaded attachments, allowing unauthenticated attackers to disclose other customers' order and attachment data.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-11T07:16:46.080Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-11T07:16:46.080Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The teddy-bear-customize-addon WordPress plugin, specifically versions through 1.0.5, contains a critical Broken Access Control vulnerability. This flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive WooCommerce order metadata and customer-uploaded files.\nThe vulnerability originates from the absence of proper authorization checks or ownership verification within the plugin's data retrieval processes. By exploiting this oversight, an attacker can enumerate and disclose private order information, including customer identity data and proprietary attachment URLs, without requiring any administrative or customer-level privileges.\nThe risk implication is high, as the exposure of order history and uploaded files can lead to significant privacy violations, potential GDPR non-compliance, and the leakage of sensitive user-submitted content. The attack surface is entirely network-exposed, requiring only knowledge of the target endpoint to facilitate exploitation. No specific preconditions beyond web access are necessary to interact with the vulnerable component, making this an easily automated reconnaissance and data exfiltration vector.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the request handling logic of the teddy-bear-customize-addon plugin. The affected component fails to validate the session state, user identity, or ownership status of the requester when processing requests for order-related data and file attachments stored via WooCommerce.\nRoot Cause Analysis: The plugin implements insecure data retrieval functions that treat incoming GET/POST requests as implicitly authorized. Because the application logic does not invoke security context checks (such as checking 'is_user_logged_in()' or verifying the 'current_user_id' against the order owner ID), the server returns sensitive objects regardless of the requester's authentication status.\nExploitation Method: An unauthenticated attacker can interact directly with the plugin’s backend endpoints. By manipulating specific parameters or appending targeted identifiers associated with WooCommerce orders (which are often sequential or discoverable), the attacker can force the plugin to query and reflect data that belongs to other users. The system processes these requests as legitimate internal calls and discloses the requested metadata or file paths in the HTTP response body.\nAttack Flow: 1. Reconnaissance: The attacker identifies the target endpoint registered by the plugin. 2. Request Crafting: The attacker generates an HTTP request targeting the data retrieval function, often by guessing or brute-forcing Order IDs. 3. Interception/Refusal Bypass: Since no authentication token or nonce validation is enforced, the server processes the request. 4. Exfiltration: The plugin returns a JSON or HTML payload containing the requested order metadata, including customer contact details, shipping information, and the direct URLs to attachments uploaded during the customization process. 5. Persistence/Impact: The attacker can continue to iterate through IDs to scrape bulk data from the database.\nImpact: Successful exploitation results in the unauthorized disclosure of PII (Personally Identifiable Information) and potentially sensitive file attachments. This constitutes a severe privacy breach and bypasses the native WooCommerce security model, which is intended to isolate order data to the administrative layer or the specific customer owner. Given the lack of logging for these unauthorized requests, such breaches may remain undetected by standard administrative monitoring."
}