Description

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 can allow attackers to execute arbitrary Python code with root privileges (UID=0) on the Langflow server by submitting components containing socket or urllib imports. This enables: (1) AWS credential theft via IMDSv1 SSRF with full IAM role permissions, (2) arbitrary file exfiltration from the container filesystem, and (3) lateral movement to internal services (PostgreSQL, Redis) within the Docker network. The scanner incorrectly returns "validated": true, providing a false security signal.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-14T22:16:56.950Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-14T22:16:56.950Z",
  "executiveSummary": "IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 contain a critical vulnerability allowing remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary Python code with root (UID=0) privileges on the underlying host or container.\nThe vulnerability stems from the application's failure to restrict the execution of user-defined components that utilize unauthorized Python modules, such as 'socket' or 'urllib'.\nSuccessful exploitation enables full system compromise, including AWS credential exfiltration via IMDSv1 SSRF, sensitive file exfiltration, and lateral movement within the containerized network environment.\nThis flaw represents a severe security risk, particularly in cloud-native deployments where the container identity may hold broad IAM permissions.\nThe vulnerability is compounded by a security scanner false-positive result, which incorrectly marks the instance as 'validated': true, misleading administrators regarding their security posture.\nImmediate action is required to restrict component execution environments or isolate the application to mitigate potential unauthorized access and data breach incidents.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the Langflow component architecture, which facilitates the dynamic execution of Python code without adequate sandboxing or input validation. By allowing components to import and utilize powerful system-level libraries, the application effectively provides an execution primitive that escapes the intended logical boundaries of the platform.\nExploitation is achieved by constructing and submitting a malicious component that leverages Python's 'socket' or 'urllib' modules. Because the Langflow process executes with root privileges (UID=0) within the Docker container, any code executed by these components inherits this high-privilege context, bypassing standard user-mode restrictions.\nThe attack flow follows a structured methodology: First, the attacker defines a component containing custom logic designed to interact with the underlying network or filesystem. Upon execution, the payload bypasses existing security filters—which are currently ineffective at blocking imports of sensitive libraries—and executes on the server.\nUpon establishing code execution, an attacker can perform the following actions: 1) SSRF exploitation via the AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDSv1). By querying the local metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254), the attacker can steal IAM role credentials associated with the node. 2) Arbitrary file exfiltration, where the attacker leverages Python's file system access to read sensitive configuration files, environment variables, or secret mounts within the container. 3) Network reconnaissance and lateral movement. Since the Langflow instance resides within a Docker network, the attacker can use the compromised container as a pivot point to scan and interact with internal-only services, such as PostgreSQL and Redis instances, that are otherwise not exposed to the public internet.\nThe impact is total container compromise. Furthermore, the presence of an incorrect 'validated': true signal in the security scanner suggests that conventional automated auditing tools are currently failing to detect the underlying implementation flaws in Langflow 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, necessitating manual code reviews and stricter architectural controls.\nNo specific authentication or secondary privilege escalation is required, as the application's functional design enables the initial execution of arbitrary code, which inherently operates at the root level."
}