Description

In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.3 code execution was possible via symlinks in an imported settings archive

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-06T17:17:22.693Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-06T17:17:22.693Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical vulnerability exists in JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA versions prior to 2026.3 that allows for arbitrary code execution during the process of importing settings archives.\nThe vulnerability is rooted in the improper handling of symbolic links contained within ZIP-based settings archives, which can be manipulated to achieve unauthorized file system operations.\nAn attacker can exploit this flaw by supplying a malicious settings archive to an unsuspecting user. Upon import, the application fails to adequately sanitize or validate symlink destinations, leading to potential path traversal or file overwrite scenarios.\nSuccessful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution, granting the attacker the ability to run malicious commands within the context of the user running the IDE.\nThis vulnerability poses a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the developer environment, as it facilitates remote code execution via social engineering or supply chain compromise of settings files.\nThere are no specific authentication or privilege requirements to trigger the flaw; it relies entirely on the IDE's internal archival processing logic during the settings import workflow.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the insecure deserialization or extraction logic used by the settings import component of IntelliJ IDEA. When a user imports a settings archive (typically a .zip file), the application extracts the contents to the local file system. If the archive contains symbolic links (symlinks) pointing to sensitive files or locations outside the intended directory structure, the extraction process fails to restrict the path resolution to the target destination folder.\nThe exploitation flow initiates when a malicious actor crafts a specialized settings archive. This archive includes a symlink entry that, upon extraction, resolves to an sensitive file path or an executable binary location. For instance, an attacker could construct a symlink that points to a user's startup directory, SSH configuration, or critical application binaries.\nWhen the IDE processes the archive, the underlying extraction mechanism creates these symlinks. If the IDE does not perform path canonicalization—or if it fails to verify the target of a symlink before creation—the symlink is written to the host file system. Subsequent IDE operations or manual user interaction with the extracted files may cause the IDE to execute or interact with the malicious symlink target. This leads to an Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) scenario where the application inadvertently executes attacker-supplied payloads.\nThe vulnerability affects all versions of IntelliJ IDEA prior to 2026.3. The flaw is not limited by network exposure, as it requires the local interaction of importing a file, making it a primary risk for supply chain attacks where a developer might import settings shared from an untrusted or compromised source.\nPost-exploitation, the attacker gains the execution privileges of the user running the JetBrains product. This allows the attacker to install persistence mechanisms, exfiltrate sensitive environment variables, or manipulate source code repositories configured within the IDE. Because the extraction occurs during the import process, the exploit is largely silent and bypassed traditional file-based malware detections that may not be context-aware regarding IDE-specific archival processing."
}