Description

In JetBrains Datalore before 2026.4 workspace collaborators could obtain the owner's SSH private key via Git backup

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-11-06T17:17:21.963Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-11-06T17:17:21.963Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is an unauthorized information disclosure flaw identified in JetBrains Datalore versions prior to 2026.4.\nThe issue arises from a failure in the application's Git backup mechanism, which inappropriately exposes sensitive cryptographic material.\nSpecifically, workspace collaborators can access and exfiltrate the SSH private key belonging to the workspace owner.\nThe impact is critical, as a compromised SSH private key allows an attacker to impersonate the owner, potentially gaining unauthorized access to the owner's remote Git repositories, private infrastructure, or other services configured with that key.\nThis vulnerability requires the attacker to have collaborator access to the Datalore workspace to initiate the exploitation.\nThere are no requirements for administrative privileges, as the information is accessible via the standard Git backup functionality provided to collaborators.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the internal Git synchronization and backup processes of the JetBrains Datalore workspace environment. In affected versions, the application logic fails to properly sanitize or restrict access to sensitive configuration files stored within the Git backup directory when collaboration features are enabled.\nWhen a workspace owner configures SSH-based authentication for Git operations, the private keys are stored in the local environment's configuration directories. Due to an oversight in the permission scoping for workspace collaborators, the Git backup workflow includes these sensitive directories in the synchronization package generated for the workspace.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1. The attacker gains access to a workspace as a collaborator. 2. The attacker triggers or waits for the automated Git backup process to run, which creates a copy of the workspace's Git configuration and metadata. 3. Because the backup mechanism does not isolate system-level credentials from project-level Git data, the exported backup file contains the workspace owner’s SSH private key files (e.g., id_rsa, id_ed25519). 4. The attacker accesses the exported Git backup files through the Datalore interface or an integrated version control management system, effectively downloading the owner's credentials.\nThe root cause is an improper trust boundary between user-level Git workspace data and system-level credential storage. The backup process essentially treats sensitive SSH keys as standard project files, making them accessible to any user with read access to the repository's historical or current data. Once the private key is extracted, the attacker can move laterally by using the key to authenticate against any service linked to the owner's identity, effectively bypassing the intended security controls of the Datalore workspace environment. The exposure is permanent once the key is exfiltrated, necessitating a complete rotation of the compromised credentials."
}