Description

LavaLite CMS through 10.1.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated low-privileged users to modify other users' accounts by abusing the AbstractRequest isWorkflow() check. Attackers can send a PATCH request to the user update route with a target identifier to change name, email, password, status, or mobile, including for administrators.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-12T13:17:27.993Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-12T13:17:27.993Z",
  "executiveSummary": "LavaLite CMS versions up to and including 10.1.2 are susceptible to a critical authorization bypass vulnerability that enables low-privileged, authenticated users to escalate their privileges or compromise arbitrary user accounts.\nThe vulnerability originates from a flawed authorization check within the application's request processing logic, specifically involving the isWorkflow() method within the AbstractRequest component.\nThis flaw allows a malicious actor to modify sensitive account data, including names, email addresses, passwords, mobile numbers, and account status, for any registered user, including administrative accounts.\nThe risk implication is severe, as it facilitates full account takeover (ATO) and unauthorized privilege escalation. Exploitation requires an active authenticated session, though the attacker does not require administrative privileges to initiate the attack.\nBy successfully manipulating PATCH requests, an attacker can bypass intended access control mechanisms, leading to complete system compromise if an administrator account is targeted. Users are advised to restrict access to update routes and monitor for unauthorized profile modifications.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the request handling architecture of LavaLite CMS, specifically within the implementation of the AbstractRequest component. The application employs an isWorkflow() check intended to validate request flow and permissions; however, this mechanism is insufficient for ensuring proper authorization during user profile update operations.\nThe root cause is an improper enforcement of access controls on the user update route. When an authenticated user submits a PATCH request to the user update endpoint, the application fails to verify if the authenticated user has sufficient authorization to modify the target resource specified by the identifier. The AbstractRequest isWorkflow() check is bypassed or incorrectly evaluated, treating unauthorized update requests as valid workflow transitions.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker establishes a valid, low-privileged authenticated session within the application. Second, the attacker crafts a malicious PATCH request targeting the user profile update endpoint, supplying the ID of the intended target account (e.g., an administrator). Third, by manipulating the request payload to include fields such as 'name', 'email', 'password', 'status', or 'mobile', the attacker forces the application to update the target's database record.\nBecause the application logic does not correlate the authenticated user's session token with the ownership of the target identifier, the backend processes the update operation with the elevated privileges or simply ignores the authorization boundary entirely. The vulnerable component is part of the request lifecycle handler which fails to validate the authorization context against the requested user resource.\nThis vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it does not require complex payloads or exploitation of memory corruption; it is a logic flaw in the application's permission enforcement layer. The impact of successful exploitation is total control over the targeted user account. If the target is an administrator, the attacker can leverage the account's existing privileges to manipulate further system configurations, delete content, or perform other administrative actions, resulting in a full system compromise.\nThe exposure is limited to authenticated users, but since LavaLite CMS may allow self-registration, the barrier to entry is extremely low. There is no requirement for the attacker to possess elevated privileges initially; the system inherently trusts the manipulated PATCH request due to the broken logic within the AbstractRequest processing chain."
}