Description

A vulnerability was found in 021is elvix-sdk up to 0.10.1. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file src/mcp/index.ts of the component MCP Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument path results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-11T08:16:33.540Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-11T08:16:33.540Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the elvix-sdk library, specifically affecting versions up to 0.10.1.\nThe vulnerability resides within the MCP Request Handler component, where insufficient validation of the 'path' argument in 'src/mcp/index.ts' allows unauthorized remote actors to force the server to perform requests to arbitrary destinations.\nBy manipulating this argument, an attacker can bypass internal network security boundaries, potentially accessing sensitive internal services, metadata endpoints, or local network resources that are otherwise unreachable from the public internet.\nThe risk is elevated due to the existence of a public exploit and the lack of a vendor response or official security patch.\nSuccessful exploitation requires no specialized authentication, granting remote attackers the ability to probe internal infrastructure, conduct port scanning, or exfiltrate data from internal-only APIs.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from improper input sanitization and validation within the MCP Request Handler logic located in 'src/mcp/index.ts'. The application processes user-supplied path information to initiate network requests without enforcing an allowlist of permitted hosts or protocols.\nIn a standard SSRF execution flow, the attacker submits a malicious request containing a crafted 'path' argument to the affected component. Because the application fails to validate this input against a defined set of trusted endpoints, the underlying HTTP client utilized by the elvix-sdk interprets the manipulated path as a valid URI target.\nThe 'path' argument is concatenated or processed directly into the internal request generation routine. An attacker can supply internal loopback addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1), private IP ranges (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), or custom URI schemes, effectively directing the SDK to communicate with arbitrary infrastructure.\nBy triggering these requests, the server acts as a proxy for the attacker. If the environment includes cloud metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254), an attacker may be able to retrieve IAM role credentials or instance configuration details. Furthermore, the attacker can use the SDK's network capability to scan internal services, identify open ports, or interact with restricted internal management interfaces that lack secondary authentication.\nThe exploitation is inherently remote and does not require pre-existing authentication, significantly lowering the barrier for entry. The lack of constraint on the request target protocol might also allow for the interaction with protocols other than HTTP/HTTPS if the underlying library supports them, potentially leading to further protocol smuggling or unauthorized command execution on adjacent infrastructure.\nPost-exploitation impact includes information disclosure, unauthorized access to backend systems, and the ability to map internal network topology from a trusted source, fundamentally undermining the security posture of the host environment."
}