Description

LaraDashboard from 1.4.0 before 1.4.8 contains a race condition vulnerability in RegisterController::register that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass the per-IP daily registration limit. Attackers can send many concurrent registration requests from one IP so all pass RegistrationGuardService::hasExceededIpLimit before recordRegistration runs, creating accounts in bulk and defeating anti-automation controls.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "3.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-10-04T00:16:36.893Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-10-04T00:16:36.893Z",
  "executiveSummary": "LaraDashboard versions 1.4.0 through 1.4.7 are susceptible to a race condition vulnerability within the account registration process.\nThis flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to circumvent established per-IP daily registration limits by leveraging concurrent request execution.\nThe vulnerability resides in the RegisterController::register method, where the check-then-act logic for rate limiting is not atomic.\nSuccessful exploitation enables adversaries to bypass anti-automation controls, facilitating bulk account creation, potential spam campaigns, or resource exhaustion attacks.\nThe risk is categorized as high due to the ease of automation and the direct compromise of security guardrails intended to prevent unauthorized account proliferation.\nExploitation requires no authentication and targets the application's front-end registration entry point.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is a classic Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition located within the RegisterController::register function of LaraDashboard.\nThe application relies on the RegistrationGuardService::hasExceededIpLimit method to validate whether an incoming registration request from a specific IP address has surpassed the configured daily threshold.\nThe flaw manifests because the registration check and the subsequent account creation process (recordRegistration) are not encapsulated within a synchronized transaction or atomic operation.\nWhen multiple registration requests are sent concurrently from the same IP address, they arrive at the application server in near-simultaneous threads. Because the 'hasExceededIpLimit' check is performed independently for each thread before the recordRegistration process updates the database state, all concurrent threads may evaluate the limit check as 'false' simultaneously.\nEssentially, by the time the first request has finished writing to the database, several subsequent requests have already passed the validation check, allowing them to proceed to the registration finalization phase.\nThis behavior effectively nullifies the rate-limiting logic, allowing an attacker to generate a large volume of accounts in a single burst, far exceeding the intended policy.\nThe attack flow involves: 1) The attacker identifies the registration endpoint; 2) The attacker crafts an automated script to transmit a high volume of concurrent HTTP requests (e.g., via tools like Burp Suite Intruder, custom Python scripts, or curl parallel processes); 3) The application processes the registration requests in parallel; 4) Each request passes the initial guard check because the state has not been updated; 5) The system creates multiple accounts, circumventing the intended per-IP limit.\nThis vulnerability is present in versions 1.4.0 up to 1.4.8. It requires no authentication and no specific privileges, making it accessible to any unauthenticated actor capable of reaching the application endpoint via standard network protocols.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes the bypass of anti-bot controls, enabling automated account farming, increased spam vectors, and potential platform abuse that the rate-limiting mechanism was specifically designed to mitigate."
}