Description

Pexip Infinity before 40.1 is affected by improper input validation in the signaling implementation that allows a malicious attacker to trigger a software abort resulting in a denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-30T03:16:58.870Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-30T03:16:58.870Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Pexip Infinity versions prior to 40.1 are susceptible to a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability stemming from improper input validation within the signaling implementation.\nThe vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send malformed signaling data, triggering an unhandled exception or software abort condition.\nThis flaw forces the service process to terminate unexpectedly, leading to a complete disruption of communication services provided by the affected Pexip Infinity node.\nThe primary risk implication is the degradation of critical collaboration infrastructure, potentially resulting in extended downtime.\nExploitation requires no specific authentication or elevated privileges, as the vulnerability is triggered through standard signaling interaction with the application.\nThe impact is limited to the availability of the signaling service; however, the ease of exploitation makes this a significant concern for environments where service continuity is paramount.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is rooted in the signaling subsystem of Pexip Infinity, specifically within the logic responsible for parsing and processing incoming signaling messages.\nImproper input validation occurs when the signaling stack fails to correctly sanitize or verify the structure, size, or content of packets received from network peers.\nThe root cause is a failure in the input-handling logic that leads to a state where the application encounters an unexpected condition, resulting in a software abort (crash).\nAn attacker can exploit this by crafting a specifically formatted signaling message that bypasses existing validation checks. When this malformed payload is processed, it induces an error condition within the memory management or protocol parsing layer that the application is not configured to handle gracefully.\nThe attack flow follows these steps: 1) The attacker initiates a connection or transmits a malicious packet directed at the signaling port of the Pexip Infinity instance. 2) The target component receives the signaling data and passes it to the affected parsing function. 3) The function identifies the malformed input but fails to transition to a safe state, instead triggering a fatal exception. 4) The process terminates immediately to prevent potential memory corruption or further undefined behavior, resulting in a denial of service for that specific node.\nBecause the signaling implementation is exposed to facilitate standard communication, the attack vector is network-accessible. This does not require prior knowledge of user credentials, as the interaction occurs at the protocol negotiation level before any authentication context might be established.\nThe resulting software abort effectively halts the signaling service, preventing any new calls from being established or maintained through the affected node. Post-exploitation, the attacker may attempt to repeat the request to maintain a persistent denial of service condition. No privilege escalation or remote code execution is associated with this specific software abort mechanism."
}