Description

A vulnerability was determined in Thinkware U3000 up to 1.02.04. This impacts the function PUT_FILE of the file /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf of the component TCP Service. Executing a manipulation of the argument path can lead to improper access controls. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-28T12:17:36.230Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-28T12:17:36.230Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an improper access control flaw within the Thinkware U3000 dashcam firmware (versions up to 1.02.04).\nThe issue exists within the TCP Service component, specifically affecting the PUT_FILE function, which fails to properly sanitize input paths when interacting with the /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf configuration file.\nThe vulnerability allows for unauthorized file modification, presenting a critical risk to device integrity and network security.\nAn unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this flaw by manipulating the path argument provided to the vulnerable function.\nSuccessful exploitation may result in the alteration of sensitive system configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized network access, interception of traffic, or complete compromise of the device's wireless communication settings.\nGiven the public availability of exploit information and the vendor's lack of responsiveness, the risk of exploitation is significantly elevated for deployed units.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the TCP Service component of the Thinkware U3000 firmware, specifically within the logic governing the PUT_FILE functionality.\nThe root cause is an insufficient validation of user-supplied input regarding file system paths, enabling a path traversal scenario.\nBy targeting the PUT_FILE function, an attacker can manipulate the path argument to bypass intended access control restrictions and write arbitrary data to restricted locations, specifically /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf.\nThe attack flow commences with the attacker establishing a remote connection to the TCP service exposed by the device. Upon initiating the PUT_FILE request, the attacker crafts a malicious payload in the 'path' parameter, utilizing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended directory sandbox.\nBecause the function fails to perform adequate input sanitization or path canonicalization, the underlying service resolves the malicious path to /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf.\nThe /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf file serves as a critical configuration repository for the wpa_supplicant utility, which manages Wi-Fi connectivity and security protocols for the device. By successfully overwriting or appending to this configuration file, the attacker can force the device to connect to a rogue access point, disable security protections, or inject arbitrary configuration parameters that alter the device's wireless network behavior.\nThis exploitation does not inherently require prior authentication, as the TCP service is susceptible to remote manipulation. The impact of such a compromise is severe, as it facilitates a man-in-the-middle position or unauthorized network ingress, potentially leading to the leakage of credentials or persistent unauthorized device control.\nThe exploitation process is straightforward once the specific path manipulation vector is identified, and due to the public disclosure of the exploit, the barrier to entry for potential attackers is extremely low."
}