Description

Missing signature validation in JSON Web Tokens in Otalio Ship Property Management System versions before 2.22.0 allows authenticated attackers to escalate privileges via tampering with JWTs

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-18T19:16:43.650Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-18T19:16:43.650Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An improper cryptographic signature verification vulnerability exists within the JSON Web Token implementation of the Otalio Ship Property Management System. This security flaw affects software versions prior to 2.22.0.\nThe vulnerability allows authenticated threat actors to execute privilege escalation attacks by maliciously tampering with the payload and cryptographic headers of intercepted or generated JSON Web Tokens.\nThe risk implication is severe, as successful exploitation undermines access control enforcement within maritime asset management operations, potentially allowing low-privileged users to assume administrative or higher-tier operational capabilities.\nExploitation requires authenticated access to the target system and the technical capability to intercept, modify, and retransmit JSON Web Tokens without relying on valid cryptographic secret validation by the server-side application logic.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability stems from the application failing to properly validate the cryptographic signature or cryptographic integrity of JSON Web Tokens during session handling and authorization checks.\nThe vulnerable component resides in the token parsing and verification routines utilized across Otalio Ship Property Management System versions before 2.22.0.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacker must possess an initial valid or baseline session context within the application, implying at least low-privileged authenticated network exposure.\nPrivilege requirements are minimal past initial authentication, as the flaw specifically targets vertical or horizontal authorization boundaries by bypassing signature verification.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1) The attacker authenticates to the Otalio Ship Property Management System to obtain a legitimate JSON Web Token. 2) The attacker intercepts or extracts the token and decodes the payload claims, specifically identifying fields related to user roles, permissions, or user identifiers. 3) The attacker modifies these claims to assert elevated privileges or administrative status. 4) Due to the absence of robust signature validation, the backend server blindly accepts the altered claims without verifying the cryptographic signature against the expected secret or public key. 5) The application processes the modified token, granting the attacker unauthorized access to restricted functionalities and elevated privileges.\nPost-exploitation impact includes full compromise of affected user sessions, unauthorized execution of administrative functions within the Ship Property Management System, and potential manipulation of sensitive maritime operational data."
}