Description

The Swagger UI Try-out console within the API Publisher documentation allows an external Swagger API definition URL to be loaded, overriding the existing API definitions within the Publisher portal. By exploiting this vulnerability, malicious actors can deceive users into interacting with these overwritten API definitions. This could lead to the exposure of sensitive information or the initiation of unintended requests to backend services.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-06T22:16:42.283Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-06T22:16:42.283Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An arbitrary API definition overwrite vulnerability has been identified within the API Publisher documentation component.\nThe vulnerability type involves improper input validation and insufficient isolation of the Swagger UI Try-out console.\nThe affected product is the API Publisher portal, specifically the Swagger UI integration used for documenting and testing APIs.\nThe primary impact of this security flaw includes the exposure of sensitive user information, deception of authenticated users, and the initiation of unauthorized or unintended requests directed toward backend services.\nAn external attacker capable of exploiting this vulnerability can leverage malicious external Swagger API definition URLs to force the application to load and render unauthorized schemas within the local context of a victim user.\nExploitation requires a user to interact with the manipulated documentation interface, thereby trusting the overwritten definitions presented by the malicious source.\nThe risk implications are significant as they undermine the integrity of the API documentation platform, potentially leading to session compromise, data exfiltration, or proxying requests through trusted enterprise channels.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the Swagger UI Try-out console feature implemented inside the API Publisher documentation interface.\nThe root cause stems from the application's failure to restrict, sanitize, or validate the source URL parameters supplied to the Swagger UI component, allowing the dynamic loading and parsing of arbitrary external Swagger API definitions.\nBy accepting an untrusted external URL, the vulnerable component overwrites the existing legitimate API definitions currently loaded within the Publisher portal DOM or application state.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker crafts a malicious external Swagger API definition hosted on a server under their control. Second, the attacker induces a targeted user to access a specially crafted link or navigate the API Publisher documentation interface such that the malicious URL is passed to the Swagger UI Try-out console. Third, the Swagger UI component fetches the external definition, processes the JSON or YAML payload, and renders the forged endpoints over the original API specifications. Fourth, when the victim interacts with the interactive Try-out console, the interface directs API calls, authentication tokens, or sensitive inputs toward the attacker's specified endpoints or unintended backend targets.\nThe vulnerable component is the Swagger UI integration module within the API Publisher documentation subsystem.\nThe payload behavior involves replacing native API schemas with rogue definitions designed to spoof legitimate services, capture user interaction data, or trick users into submitting sensitive credentials or parameters to adversarial endpoints.\nPost-exploitation impact includes unauthorized data exposure, CSRF-like proxy attacks against internal backend services, and social engineering vectors targeting administrative or developer workflows within the Publisher portal."
}