Description

IBM System Storage DS8A00 10.1.3.0 through 10.11.35.0 and IBM DS8900F 89.40.83.0 through 89.44.25.0 could allow an authenticated user to read or modify another user's command history due to an externally controlled filename.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-19T22:16:36.640Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-19T22:16:36.640Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An externally controlled filename vulnerability has been identified in IBM System Storage DS8A00 (versions 10.1.3.0 through 10.11.35.0) and IBM DS8900F (versions 89.40.83.0 through 89.44.25.0). This flaw allows an authenticated user to read or modify another user's command history.\nThe vulnerability type centers on improper input validation and handling of externally controlled filenames within the command logging or history management subsystem.\nThe primary impact is a breach of confidentiality and integrity, as malicious or unauthorized actors can intercept sensitive administrative commands, view previously executed operations, or alter command logs to cover malicious tracks or inject false data into another user's operational context.\nThe affected systems include enterprise-grade storage controllers running vulnerable firmware versions of IBM System Storage DS8A00 and IBM DS8900F.\nThe risk implications involve potential privilege escalation vectors, exposure of sensitive operational parameters or credentials passed via command-line interfaces, and compromised non-repudiation controls.\nTo exploit this vulnerability, an attacker requires valid authentication to the target storage system, possessing standard user privileges that interact with the command history or shell environment. No specific pre-existing advanced privileges are stated as mandatory beyond initial authentication, though the exact execution context depends on session handling and file access controls governing the command history storage mechanism.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the insecure handling of externally controlled filenames used by the application when referencing, storing, or retrieving user command history data. Instead of properly isolating user sessions and enforcing strict path canonicalization or randomized, user-specific storage names derived securely from internal session identifiers, the application accepts or constructs file paths influenced by user-supplied or externally manipulable parameters.\nThe vulnerable component is the command history management subsystem responsible for persisting and recalling shell or CLI command execution history for active sessions on IBM System Storage DS8A00 and IBM DS8900F.\nThe affected versions comprise IBM System Storage DS8A00 10.1.3.0 through 10.11.35.0 and IBM DS8900F 89.40.83.0 through 89.44.25.0.\nExploitation requires an attacker to be authenticated to the target storage platform. The network exposure corresponds to the standard management interfaces provided by the storage controllers (such as secure shell or proprietary CLI management endpoints) utilized for administrative and operational tasks.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the authenticated attacker establishes a management session with the storage controller. Second, by interacting with the CLI or management interface, the attacker identifies or manipulates the mechanisms or parameters that dictate how command history files are targeted or referenced. Due to the lack of adequate input sanitization and access boundary enforcement regarding externally controlled filenames, the application fails to validate whether the targeted history file belongs to the currently authenticated session or user.\nThird, the attacker crafts a request or modifies environmental references to point to a different user's command history file path. Because the underlying file system operations execute with permissions that can read or write across user history boundaries, the application processes the request against the arbitrary file path.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data contained within the command history, such as plain-text passwords, cryptographic keys, or administrative configuration parameters passed as arguments. Furthermore, an attacker can modify another user's command history, injecting malicious commands or altering historical audit trails, thereby compromising system integrity and operational accountability."
}