Description

In multi-tenant deployments, the Publisher REST APIs fail to enforce tenant isolation correctly. This allows a user in one tenant, possessing sufficient privileges to invoke these APIs, to perform operations that impact other tenants. The vulnerability allows a privileged user to perform publisher operations such as exposing or modifying API Metadata in another tenant environment. This impact is only realized in multi-tenant deployments.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-06T22:16:41.420Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-06T22:16:41.420Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is an authorization and tenant isolation bypass flaw affecting multi-tenant deployments utilizing Publisher REST APIs.\nThe security defect allows an authenticated user within one tenant, provided they possess sufficient privileges within their own context, to execute operations that impact separate, isolated tenant environments.\nThe primary impact involves unauthorized cross-tenant actions, specifically the exposure or modification of API Metadata across distinct tenant boundaries.\nThis risk is exclusively realized in multi-tenant deployment configurations where strict logical separation between tenants is required.\nAttacker capabilities require a valid user account with sufficient privileges to invoke the Publisher REST APIs, which are then leveraged to abuse missing access controls.\nExploitation requirements dictate that the attacker must already possess valid credentials and adequate functional privileges, after which the missing tenant isolation checks permit unauthorized state reading or mutation across tenant boundaries.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability lies in the failure of the Publisher REST APIs to adequately validate and enforce tenant context boundaries during authorization and request processing.\nThe vulnerable component comprises the Publisher REST API endpoints responsible for handling API Metadata operations within multi-tenant deployments.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacking user must authenticate successfully to the system and hold sufficient functional privileges to interact with the Publisher REST APIs.\nPrivilege requirements include possessing administrative or operational privileges within the attacker's own assigned tenant environment, which are improperly trusted across tenant boundaries due to missing authorization checks.\nNetwork exposure involves the Publisher REST APIs accessible via standard network protocols within the multi-tenant architecture.\nThe exploitation method and attack flow proceed as follows: First, the authenticated, privileged user targets the Publisher REST APIs. Second, the user crafts requests directed at resources, specifically API Metadata, belonging to a different tenant environment. Third, because the backend logic fails to verify whether the requesting user's tenant identifier matches the target resource's tenant scope, the application processes the request. Finally, the attacker successfully exposes or modifies the API Metadata of the victim tenant, resulting in a complete breach of tenant isolation.\nPost-exploitation impact includes unauthorized data exposure of sensitive API Metadata belonging to foreign tenants, as well as unauthorized modification or tampering with cross-tenant configurations, undermining the integrity and confidentiality guarantees of the multi-tenant architecture."
}